Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain local user account on shared host
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DeliveryPre-create world-writable vifm-ipc-vifm FIFO in shared temp dir
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ExploitVictim launches vifm and reuses the FIFO
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ExecutionInject IPC packet with -c and ! shell commands
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ImpactCommands execute with victim's privileges
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Ownership verification
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires a multi-user system where vifm uses a shared temporary directory, and a local attacker account able to create a world-writable vifm-ipc-vifm FIFO there before the victim runs vifm. The victim must then actually launch vifm (UI:P passive interaction), at which point the stale, attacker-owned FIFO is reused without an ownership check. Exploitation is limited to shared hosts with a common temp directory; single-user systems and sessions where the victim never starts vifm after the malicious FIFO is planted are not affected, and the attacker needs an existing local foothold (PR:L). |
| Impact | This is a genuine but conditional local privilege/trust-boundary flaw rather than a mass-exploitation priority. The provided CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P, score 7.0 High) is internally consistent with the description: exploitation requires local access (AV:L), an existing low-privileged account (PR:L), and passive victim interaction (UI:P) in that the victim must independently launch vifm. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or POC flag was supplied in the input; per the data available this is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis', though a technical write-up (hackmd) and a VulnCheck advisory are referenced and describe the mechanism in detail, so working exploit knowledge is effectively public even if no packaged exploit is confirmed. There is no SSVC decision data provided. The signals do not conflict: a High-but-not-Critical score, local-only vector, and required victim interaction all point to a realistic threat on shared multi-user hosts rather than widespread remote compromise. CWE-283 (unverified ownership) matches the root cause. Note the input Tag 'Information Disclosure' contradicts the description and the VC:H/VI:H/VA:H impact - this is cross-user arbitrary command execution, not information disclosure. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | On a shared multi-user Linux host, a local attacker pre-creates a world-writable FIFO named vifm-ipc-vifm in the shared temporary directory. When the victim later launches vifm, it reuses the attacker-owned FIFO without verifying ownership; the attacker writes an IPC packet containing -c and ! shell commands that then execute with the victim's privileges. Technical write-ups (hackmd, VulnCheck advisory) document the mechanism, but no packaged public exploit is confirmed in the input. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 14, 2026
Vifm file manager versions 0.8.1-beta through 0.14.4 reuse an already-existing IPC FIFO named vifm-ipc-vifm in the shared temporary directory without verifying who owns it, so a local attacker who plants a world-writable FIFO can feed it IPC packets containing -c and ! shell commands that then run with the victim's privileges. Reaching the flaw requires a multi-user host with a common temp directory, a local foothold on that host (PR:L), and a victim who subsequently starts vifm (UI:R passive interaction); the independent assessment rates this CVSS:3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8 High), while the supplied CVSS 4.0 vector scores 7.0. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation have been identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patch has been identified, since the referenced source at v0.14.4 still contains the vulnerable FIFO handling.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis: the references point at the v0.14.4 source and release, and that version still contains the unverified-ownership FIFO handling, so upgrading to 0.14.4 does not close the issue and no fixed release version can be cited from the available data. Until upstream addresses the ownership check in src/ipc.c, the most effective compensating control is to deny the attacker the shared directory: run vifm with a private per-user temporary directory (for example a 0700 directory exported via TMPDIR or the equivalent environment variable) so that no other local account can create files at the location vifm consults, accepting the side effect that other programs inheriting that environment will also write to the private path. On hosts where the shared temp directory cannot be changed, remove any pre-existing vifm-ipc-vifm FIFO from the shared location before starting vifm and verify its ownership and permissions (world-writable entries owned by another UID are hostile), understanding that this must be repeated every session or automated through a launcher wrapper. Administrators of multi-user systems where local accounts are not mutually trusted should treat vifm as unsafe to run against a shared /tmp and restrict it to single-user hosts or per-user namespaces/containers, which is a strong mitigation but limits where the tool can be deployed. Monitor the referenced advisory (https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vifm-0.8.1-beta-through-0.14.4-unverified-ipc-fifo-ownership-allows-cross-user-command-execution) and the project's release page (https://github.com/vifm/vifm/releases/tag/v0.14.4) for a version that adds an ownership check, and audit shared temporary directories for unexpected vifm-ipc-vifm files as a detection measure.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
Vifm uses a named pipe (FIFO) in the system temporary directory for inter-process communication between instances; the vulnerable code paths are in src/ipc.c (the FIFO lookup/creation logic around lines 394-443 and the packet handling around lines 866-874 as shipped in v0.14.4). The root cause falls under CWE-283, Unverified Ownership: the process attaches to a pre-existing vifm-ipc-vifm FIFO in a world-writable shared location without validating that the file is owned by the current user or protected by restrictive permissions. Because the shared temp directory allows other local accounts to pre-create that exact filename, an attacker can seed a hostile FIFO before the victim launches vifm; when the victim's session reuses it, attacker-supplied IPC packets carrying -c command and ! shell-command directives are executed with the victim's identity and file access rights. The trust boundary here is the shared temporary directory combined with the implicit assumption that any existing IPC endpoint belongs to the same user, an assumption that does not hold on multi-user systems. EUVD records the affected range as vifm 0.8.1-beta through 0.14.4 with no CPE strings enumerated in the supplied data, and the source-code references and the v0.14.4 release page (which contains only documentation, message-text, sample vifmrc and general bugfix changes) confirm that the vulnerable release line extends through the current public version.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Local attacker with own account (AV:L, PR:L) plants a FIFO with no special complexity (AC:L); victim must launch vifm (UI:R); arbitrary command execution as the victim yields full C/I/A impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (vulncheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: vulncheck
DescriptionCVE.org
Vifm 0.8.1-beta through 0.14.4 reuses a pre-existing IPC FIFO in the shared temporary directory without checking ownership, allowing local users to execute commands as another user. Attackers can pre-create a world-writable vifm-ipc-vifm FIFO and write IPC packets with -c and ! shell commands that execute with the victim's privileges.
Executive ViewAI
Vifm file manager versions 0.8.1-beta through 0.14.4 contain a local command-execution flaw that affects multi-user systems sharing a common temporary directory. An authenticated local attacker with an existing foothold can cause commands to run with the privileges of a user who later starts Vifm, creating a significant trust and segregation risk on shared workstations, jump hosts, and multi-tenant environments. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, so leadership should prioritize inventory, isolation, and compensating controls.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis; interim mitigations include removing or disabling Vifm 0.8.1-beta through 0.14.4 on multi-user hosts, enforcing per-user private temporary directories (e.g., systemd PrivateTmp, PAM namespaces, TMPDIR isolation), restricting local user access, and monitoring for and removing unexpected world-writable vifm-ipc-vifm FIFOs in shared temporary locations.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
EUVD-2026-99021
GHSA-vf53-5m97-qg59
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB