Amazon Athena CVE-2026-107352

Requires a valid authenticated AWS principal with access to Amazon Athena engine version 3 request handling (PR:L); it is not exploitable by unauthenticated internet users. No special non-default configuration is named - the authorization gap existed in standard Athena v3 request handling, so default deployments were affected. Exploitation is strictly LIMITED to reading cross-account query metadata (AWS account identifiers and SQL statement text); query results, credentials, and S3 data were not reachable. The condition no longer exists because AWS remediated it in the managed service on September 1, 2026, so it is not currently exploitable and no customer action is required.

The input CVSS of 7.7 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) is driven primarily by the network vector, low attack complexity, scope change (crossing the AWS account boundary), and a High confidentiality rating. However, the description scopes the actual impact tightly: only limited query metadata (AWS account identifiers and SQL statement text) could be read, while query results, credentials, and S3 data were explicitly NOT affected, so the C:H rating is arguably generous relative to the real data exposure. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, no POC, and no SSVC decision data were provided, so exploitation-probability and automatability signals cannot be weighed - this is a data gap, not evidence of safety. Most importantly, AWS reports the flaw was remediated server-side on September 1, 2026 in a managed service requiring no customer action, and states no customer metadata was actually accessed, meaning residual real-world risk to customers today is effectively zero. Net: this reads as a legitimately high-CVSS finding at discovery time (a cross-tenant authorization gap breaking account isolation in a multi-tenant cloud service) but a LOW current operational priority given full vendor remediation and the absence of any exploitation evidence. The high score reflects the scope change and tenant-isolation break, not a widespread condition customers must patch.

An authenticated AWS principal with access to Amazon Athena engine version 3 sends crafted API requests whose cross-account authorization is not properly enforced, allowing them to read limited query metadata - AWS account identifiers and SQL statement text - belonging to other AWS accounts. No public exploit code was identified, and because the vector is network-based with low complexity (AV:N/AC:L), a valid Athena-enabled AWS credential was effectively the main prerequisite. AWS remediated the issue server-side on September 1, 2026 and states no customer metadata was accessed.