ImageMagick CVE-2026-106580

Exploitation requires that ImageMagick decode an attacker-controlled CUT-format image AND that the CUT coder be enabled; the security impact is only meaningful where a policy.xml defines read restrictions that the missing check circumvents - on an unrestricted install there is no policy to bypass. The specific flaw is that ReadCUTImage builds a companion '.PAL' palette filename and opens it via fopen_utf8 without first calling IsPathAuthorized(ReadPolicyRights,...), so it reads a file the policy should deny. Limiting factors: the vector is LOCAL (the crafted file must reach a local decode operation, e.g., an upload-processing pipeline), attack complexity is HIGH, impact is limited to low-grade information disclosure and a possible crash, and no remote/network exploitation path exists.

This is a genuinely medium/low-priority issue despite being a security-policy bypass. The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L, base 4.0) is internally consistent with the description: exploitation is LOCAL (attacker must get a crafted CUT file decoded by the target), requires HIGH attack complexity, needs no privileges, and yields only LOW confidentiality impact (reading data policy should deny) plus LOW availability impact (a crash). There is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit in the provided intelligence, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' The real-world risk is confined to a narrow population: deployments that specifically rely on ImageMagick's policy.xml as a sandbox/access-control boundary (e.g., servers decoding untrusted uploads), because the bug lets the CUT coder read a companion palette file that the policy would otherwise deny. Outside of policy-hardened deployments, the missing check has little practical consequence. No signals conflict - all available data (vector, impact, access control CWE-284) point to a limited-impact local information-disclosure/DoS, not a widespread remote threat.

An image service hardens ImageMagick with a policy.xml that forbids reading certain local paths, then decodes an attacker-supplied CUT image. Because the CUT coder opens a derived companion '.PAL' palette file without calling IsPathAuthorized, the attacker can cause ImageMagick to read a file the policy should deny - leaking its contents into the output or crashing the process. No public exploit was identified, and the local vector plus high complexity (AV:L/AC:H) make reliable exploitation non-trivial.