Plane CVE-2026-105631

For the unauthenticated path (EntityAssetEndpoint): the attacker must know (1) a valid published deploy-board anchor belonging to the target workspace and (2) a valid UUID of an issue-description or comment-description FileAsset in an unpublished or private project within that same workspace. For the authenticated paths (WorkspaceFileAssetEndpoint/WorkspaceAssetDownloadEndpoint): the attacker must be an active member of the workspace and know the asset's UUID, but need NOT be a member of the asset's project. Key limiting factors: FileAsset UUIDs are random and non-enumerable (the reason for AC:H), so an attacker must leak or otherwise obtain them; the unauthenticated path is further limited to issue/comment-description entity assets exposed through a valid anchor. Affects all versions prior to 1.4.0.

This is a genuine access-control flaw (CWE-639, IDOR) rather than an inflated high-CVSS issue, but its real-world priority is moderate rather than urgent. The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N = 7.5) is internally consistent with the description: the EntityAssetEndpoint path is genuinely unauthenticated (AllowAny, justifying PR:N), network-reachable (AV:N), and crosses from a public-anchor security context into private-project data (S:C). The AC:H rating is the key tempering signal - exploitation requires the attacker to already know BOTH a valid deploy-board anchor AND a valid random FileAsset UUID, neither of which is enumerable, so this is not a spray-and-pray mass-exploitation bug. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public exploit was provided in the input, so there is no evidence of active exploitation; the only public artifacts are the vendor advisory and patch commits/PRs, which disclose the mechanism but are not weaponized exploit code. Note one nuance the single CVSS vector obscures: the vulnerability actually spans two different privilege contexts - the WorkspaceFileAssetEndpoint/WorkspaceAssetDownloadEndpoint paths require authenticated workspace membership (effectively PR:L), while only the EntityAssetEndpoint path is truly unauthenticated (PR:N); the published 7.5 reflects the worst-case unauthenticated path. Overall: a legitimate confidentiality issue worth patching promptly, but the UUID/anchor knowledge requirement makes opportunistic exploitation unlikely absent an information leak.

An unauthenticated attacker who has discovered a valid public deploy-board (published page) anchor for a Plane workspace, and who has obtained a valid issue-description or comment-description FileAsset UUID (e.g. leaked in logs, referrers, or prior access), calls the AllowAny EntityAssetEndpoint.get with that anchor and UUID and receives the asset even though it belongs to an unpublished or private project in the workspace. Alternatively, an authenticated low-privilege workspace member who is not a member of a private project downloads that project's assets via WorkspaceFileAssetEndpoint by supplying a known asset UUID. No public exploit code was identified; however, the fixing PRs (#9288) publicly document the vulnerable code paths, lowering the research barrier.