EUVD-2026-102429Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessGain adjacent-network access to device
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DeliveryDiscover enabled SSH service
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ExploitAuthenticate with default root credentials
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ExecutionObtain interactive root shell
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ImpactTake full control / pivot into network
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Credential externalization
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Persistence, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | The required condition is the default-shipped state of the firmware itself: the EnergizeLab AI Station (RK3562) image ships with hard-coded root credentials AND an SSH daemon enabled by default, so no misconfiguration or special feature toggle is needed - any device running stock firmware is vulnerable. The limiting factor is reachability, not authentication: per the CVSS AV:A vector the attacker must already have network-adjacent access to the device's SSH port (same LAN/subnet, or a deployment that exposes SSH to a wider network/the internet). There is no required user interaction and no pre-existing privilege on the device (PR:N) because the credentials are publicly known defaults. |
| Impact | This is a genuinely high-priority flaw for any organization running the affected device, not a high-CVSS-but-low-risk paper issue. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 8.8) is internally consistent with the description: hard-coded default root credentials (CWE-798) over an enabled-by-default SSH service give an attacker immediate, no-prerequisite root control with low complexity and no user interaction. Because the credentials are static and shared across the firmware image, exploitation is trivially repeatable and effectively 'automatable' once the credentials are known - SSVC technical impact would be 'total.' However, key corroborating signals are MISSING rather than conflicting: no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no vendor-confirmed POC flag are present in the input, so real-world exploitation volume cannot be quantified. The single mitigating factor is attack vector: the CVSS uses AV:A (adjacent/network-adjacent) rather than AV:N, so exploitation presumes the attacker already has network reachability to the device's SSH port (same LAN/segment or an exposed-to-internet deployment) - this materially narrows the realistic attacker population compared to a true remote-internet flaw. Net: treat as a must-remediate for exposed/networked units, but footprint is limited by product prevalence (see below). |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker on the same network segment as an EnergizeLab AI Station (RK3562) device scans for and connects to its enabled SSH service, then authenticates using the publicly-shippable default root credentials to obtain an interactive root shell. With full root control they can exfiltrate data, alter device behavior, or pivot deeper into the network. Given AV:A and AC:L, no special tooling or user interaction is required; the referenced GitHub repository may contain the credentials or a POC but this is not confirmed from the provided metadata. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 15, 2026
The EnergizeLab AI Station (RK3562) firmware image ships with hard-coded root credentials and an SSH daemon enabled by default, so any attacker who can reach the device's SSH port from the same LAN or adjacent network segment can log in as root and take complete control of the unit. Rated CVSS 8.8 (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), the flaw needs no authentication, no user interaction, and no pre-existing privilege on the device - the only barrier is network reachability, per the adjacent-network attack vector. No vendor patch has been identified at time of analysis, and no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) was identified; because every device running stock firmware is affected by design rather than by misconfiguration, this is a high-priority issue for any organization with these units deployed, not a paper-only finding.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch was identified at time of analysis, so the priority is to eliminate the exposure created by the default root credential and the enabled SSH daemon. Immediately log in with the documented default root credentials and set a strong, unique password on every deployed unit, and where the firmware allows it, disable password-based SSH authentication and install per-device public keys - the trade-off is that this must be done before the device is exposed, and lost keys require physical or serial-console recovery. If SSH is not operationally required, disable the daemon entirely; if it is required, restrict port 22 to a dedicated management VLAN or specific administrative host addresses and block it from general user subnets, accepting that remote support workflows will need a jump host. Segment AI Station devices onto an isolated network with no inbound access from guest, IoT, or internet-facing segments and firewall SSH at the perimeter, which reduces reachability (the sole limiting factor in the AV:A vector) at the cost of extra network engineering. Because the credentials are identical across all units from the same image, treat any historically exposed device as compromised and reimage or audit it before returning it to service. Monitor https://github.com/xn0tsa/your-secrets-are-safe-with-me, https://takeonme.org/gcves/GCVE-1337-2026-00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001110111111110111111111111000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001101/, and https://www.theverge.com/tech/1010727/eiliko-robot-hack-energize-lab for a vendor fix, and apply a patched firmware release as soon as EnergizeLab publishes one.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affects your stack
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials): the firmware image for the EnergizeLab AI Station, which is built on the Rockchip RK3562 SoC, bakes a fixed root password into the shipped filesystem instead of forcing per-device credential provisioning or a first-boot setup flow. In parallel, the OpenSSH (or equivalent) daemon is enabled by default and listening on the network, turning a static credential into a directly reachable remote entry point. Because the password is identical across all units produced from the same image, it cannot be treated as a secret - it is effectively an unauthenticated remote root path for anyone on the adjacent network. The CPE cpe:2.3:a:energizelab:ai_station_firmware_(rk3562):*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* uses a wildcard version, indicating that the affected condition applies to the firmware line rather than to one specific build. The CVSS vector's AV:A/PR:N combination captures this precisely: adjacency is required, but no credentials must be guessed, cracked, or obtained - they are already known defaults. References point to a write-up repository (xn0tsa/your-secrets-are-safe-with-me), a GCVE record, and press coverage of an associated Eiliko robot hack, which together suggest coordinated community reporting rather than a vendor advisory.
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Severity by source
AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Default root creds over enabled SSH need no prior privilege (PR:N) and are low-complexity (AC:L); AV:A reflects required network-adjacent reachability to the device, and root yields full C:H/I:H/A:H.
Primary rating from Vendor (AHA).
CVSS VectorVendor: AHA
DescriptionCVE.org
The EnergizeLab AI Station (RK3562) firmware image ships with default root credentials and SSH enabled. An attacker with network access to the device can log in as root and take full control of it.
Executive ViewAI
Every EnergizeLab AI Station (RK3562) running stock firmware is remotely accessible via hard-coded root credentials with SSH enabled by default, meaning any attacker with network adjacency can seize full control of the device without any credentials, user interaction, or prior access. Unlike a misconfiguration, this weakness is embedded in the firmware itself, so patching or hardening individual units will not resolve it. Leadership should treat all deployed units as compromised-capable endpoints that can serve as a foothold into the internal network and any data or OT systems they connect to.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: isolate affected devices on a dedicated VLAN or network segment with firewall/ACL rules blocking inbound SSH (TCP/22) from untrusted zones; disable the SSH daemon where operationally feasible; enforce strict egress filtering from the devices; monitor authentication and network logs for anomalous SSH sessions; and rotate any credentials stored on or passing through the devices.
Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
GitHub
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Exploit-DB