Coolify CVE-2025-64419

Requires that the Coolify instance permits the 'docker compose' build pack and that a victim user creates/deploys an application sourced from an attacker-controlled Git repository containing a malicious docker-compose.yaml. Exploitation is limited by the mandatory user interaction (a legitimate user must initiate the build from the attacker's repo) - there is no purely remote, no-interaction path. Affected: all Coolify versions prior to 4.0.0-beta.445; fixed in 4.0.0-beta.445. Installations that only build trusted, internally-controlled repositories are not realistically exposed.

This is a genuine high-severity issue but one whose real-world exploitation is gated by social engineering rather than direct remote access. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, 8.8) reflects an unauthenticated network attacker achieving full CIA impact as root, but the UI:R flag is doing heavy lifting: a legitimate Coolify user must voluntarily create an application from an attacker-controlled repository using the 'docker compose' build pack. The EPSS score of 0.09% (26th percentile) is low and aligns with this - mass, indiscriminate exploitation is unlikely because each compromise requires a targeted victim action. POC availability is limited to the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-234r-xrrg-m8f3), which is a weak signal: it documents the flaw but is not a weaponized standalone exploit, so 'publicly available exploit code exists' should not be conflated with active exploitation. Not in CISA KEV. The signals are internally consistent - high technical impact (root RCE) but low probability of widespread exploitation - so this is a real priority for defenders who let untrusted users trigger builds, but a lower priority for closed/single-tenant Coolify installs. No data conflicts; the CVSS vector matches the description well.

An attacker publishes a Git repository containing a crafted docker-compose.yaml with shell metacharacters embedded in a parameter that Coolify passes unsanitized into a docker compose command. They socially engineer a Coolify user into deploying that repository with the 'docker compose' build pack. When Coolify builds the application, the injected command executes on the Coolify host as root. A proof-of-concept is described in the vendor GitHub Security Advisory, though no weaponized standalone exploit is published.