Apache Airflow CVE-2025-62402

Exploitation requires an authenticated API user (CVSS PR:L) who can reach the /api/v2/dagReports endpoint of the Airflow REST API, AND a specific deployment topology where the api-server is deployed in an environment where DAG files are present/available to it. The primary limiting factor is this deployment mode: if DAG files are not co-located with or readable by the api-server (e.g., strict separation of api-server from DAG storage), the code-execution path does not apply. Additional limiters are the authentication requirement (not unauthenticated) and the need for the API user to have access to the dagReports functionality. This is not exploitable against a default, locked-down configuration without API credentials.

This is a moderate-priority issue, not a top-tier emergency. The vendor CVSS of 5.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N) describes a network-reachable but authenticated (PR:L) flaw with limited confidentiality and integrity impact and no availability impact. EPSS is low at 0.52% (42nd percentile), indicating no statistical signal of imminent mass exploitation. The CVE is NOT listed in CISA KEV and no public exploit code was identified in the provided data, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' There is a notable tension between the 'RCE' tag and the official scoring: the description says API users can achieve 'Dag code execution in the context of the api-server,' which sounds like code execution, yet the vendor rated impact only C:L/I:L/A:N rather than high - this is because the CWE-250 (execution with unnecessary privileges) issue is constrained by requiring an authenticated API user AND a specific deployment where DAG files are co-located with the api-server. Treat the 'RCE' tag as aspirational/worst-case rather than confirmed unauthenticated remote code execution; verify the real impact against your Airflow deployment topology.

An authenticated Airflow API user with access to the /api/v2/dagReports endpoint crafts a request that causes the api-server to parse/execute DAG file code, running it in the api-server's context rather than a sandboxed worker. In deployments where DAG files are present on the api-server host, this lets a low-privileged API user execute code with the api-server's privileges. No public proof-of-concept was identified in the provided intelligence.