GHSA-vqcx-5xmf-2c7g
Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
File delivered over network (AV:N), no complexity or privileges required (AC:L, PR:N), but user must invoke MP4Box on the file (UI:R); only process crash demonstrated, no C/I impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (CNA).
CVSS VectorVendor
Lifecycle Timeline
1Description PRE-NVD
AnalysisAI
Stack-based buffer overflow in GPAC's MP4Box tool crashes the process when parsing a crafted MP4 file containing a malformed non-self-delimited Opus packet. The function gf_opus_read_length() in media_tools/av_parsers.c performs a 2-byte out-of-bounds write into a stack-allocated pckh structure at offset 568, confirmed by AddressSanitizer at line 11140. No active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV, but a public proof-of-concept MP4 file is available from the reporter, and the CVSS vector (PR:N, UI:R) indicates any user or automated pipeline invoking MP4Box on untrusted Opus-bearing MP4 files is at risk of a process crash.
Technical ContextAI
GPAC is an open-source multimedia framework; MP4Box is its command-line tool used for MP4 muxing, demuxing, inspection, and track manipulation. The vulnerability is rooted in CWE-121 (Stack-based Buffer Overflow): gf_opus_read_length() in media_tools/av_parsers.c:11140 computes a length value from a malformed, non-self-delimited Opus packet with an invalid odd packet length, then writes that 2-byte value back into the pckh stack object (fixed-size, allocated in gf_inspect_dump_opus_internal()) without first validating that the computed offset falls within the struct's bounds. The call chain is gf_inspect_dump_opus_internal() → gf_opus_parse_packet_header() → gf_opus_read_length(). This overflow path is triggered specifically during Opus track inspection and XML dump operations. The fix is tracked upstream at commit ff8249a407685d00ceb5f4d2a798b9cad195140e in the gpac/gpac GitHub repository. No CPE strings were provided in available intelligence.
RemediationAI
The upstream fix is available as commit ff8249a407685d00ceb5f4d2a798b9cad195140e in the gpac/gpac GitHub repository; users should rebuild GPAC from a source tree containing this commit. A tagged or released patched version has not been independently confirmed from available data - users should monitor the upstream releases page and the GitHub issue https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/3161 for an official release announcement. As a compensating control for automated pipelines, restrict MP4Box to processing only trusted, validated MP4 files and avoid invoking Opus track dump or XML inspection operations (e.g., -dxml flag) on externally supplied content. Sandboxing MP4Box invocations (e.g., via seccomp, containers, or least-privilege service accounts) limits blast radius to a process crash rather than broader system impact. Disabling Opus track processing specifically is not straightforwardly configurable via flags but avoiding -dxml and related dump operations reduces exposure. Advisory references: https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/915 and https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/3161.
Same weakness CWE-121 – Stack-based Buffer Overflow
View allSame technique Buffer Overflow
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2025-210151