Veeam Backup & Replication
CVE-2025-55125
CRITICAL
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Description requires a Backup/Tape Operator role, so PR:L not PR:N; remote over the management interface (AV:N), no user interaction, and command injection yields full root code execution (C/I/A:H).
Primary rating from NVD.
CVSS VectorNVD
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionNVD
This vulnerability allows a Backup or Tape Operator to perform remote code execution (RCE) as root by creating a malicious backup configuration file.
AnalysisAI
Remote code execution as root in Veeam Backup & Replication allows an authenticated Backup Operator or Tape Operator to run arbitrary OS commands on the Veeam host by crafting a malicious backup configuration file. The vendor scores this 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), but the description itself establishes a privileged-role prerequisite, and our independent assessment rates it AV:N/AC:L/PR:L (authenticated low-privilege), meaning exploitation is gated behind an already-delegated Backup or Tape Operator account rather than being available to any unauthenticated network attacker. No user interaction is required, EPSS is low at 0.07% (22nd percentile), and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis; the severe root-level impact makes this a high-value target wherever those operator roles are delegated to less-trusted users.
Technical ContextAI
The flaw is a CWE-77 command injection in Veeam Backup & Replication, where content taken from a backup configuration file is passed to an OS command without adequate neutralization, so an attacker who can author that configuration can inject commands that execute with the privileges of the Veeam service - root on Linux-appliance style deployments and SYSTEM/service context on Windows. The supplied CPE (cpe:2.3:a:veeam:veeam_backup_&_replication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*) identifies the affected product line, and the vulnerability is version-agnostic in the intelligence feed, so the fix must be selected from the vendor advisory rather than inferred. The critical analytic point is the conflict between the vendor's PR:N vector and the technical precondition: reaching the vulnerable command-handling path requires an account already holding the Backup Operator or Tape Operator role, which maps to PR:L in the assessed vector. This is a privilege-escalation-style RCE - a trusted-but-restricted operator role is repurposed to obtain root - rather than an anonymous network exploit, so the attack surface is the delegated-role population inside Veeam, not the internet edge.
RemediationAI
Obtain and apply the vendor fix referenced in Veeam's advisory at https://www.veeam.com/kb4792 - patch availability is confirmed per vendor advisory, but because the intelligence feed does not enumerate an exact fixed build number, administrators must read the KB to identify the precise patched version for their release and apply it to all Veeam Backup & Replication servers and proxies. Until the patch is deployed, the most effective compensating control is to tightly restrict the Backup Operator and Tape Operator roles: revoke them from any account that does not strictly need them, avoid delegating them to help-desk, service, or shared accounts, and require re-approval for such assignments; the trade-off is reduced operational flexibility for backup teams, which is acceptable given that a single such account yields root. Additional measures include enforcing MFA and strong unique credentials on every account holding those roles (reduces phishing/compromise of the prerequisite account, but does not help if an attacker already has valid operator credentials), and disabling or renaming unused operator accounts so the population of reachable preconditions is minimal. Monitor Veeam logs and the backup configuration directory for creation or modification of configuration files by operator accounts, and alert on unexpected child processes spawned by Veeam services, since root-level command execution is otherwise difficult to distinguish from legitimate backup activity. Network segmentation that prevents operator workstations from reaching the Veeam management interface outside approved admin paths adds defense in depth but should not be treated as a substitute for patching.
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External POC / Exploit Code
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