GitLab EE CVE-2025-11247

Exploitation requires a valid authenticated GitLab Enterprise Edition account (PR:L) with access to the GraphQL API endpoint, plus the ability to construct specifically crafted GraphQL queries that reference private-project resources the account is not authorized to view. It affects GitLab EE versions 13.2 up to (not including) 18.4.6, 18.5 before 18.5.4, and 18.6 before 18.6.2 - Community Edition and patched versions are not in scope. Limiting factors: the attacker must first obtain or register an account on the target instance (reducing risk on locked-down private instances but raising it on public-signup or multi-tenant SaaS deployments), and impact is confined to confidentiality disclosure of private project data (no write/integrity or availability effect).

This is a genuine-but-low-priority authorization flaw, not a high-severity emergency. The CVSS 3.1 base score of 4.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) is internally consistent: network vector and low complexity, but it requires an authenticated low-privilege account (PR:L), yields only limited confidentiality impact (C:L) and produces no integrity or availability impact (I:N/A:N). This maps to CWE-639 (authorization bypass through a user-controlled key / IDOR), meaning an existing authenticated user can read data they should not - it is NOT an authentication bypass despite the input tag. Signals align toward low real-world urgency: EPSS is 0.24% (14th percentile), there is NO CISA KEV listing, and no confirmed public exploit code. A HackerOne report (#3307422) exists, indicating responsible disclosure via GitLab's bug bounty, but a HackerOne reference is not the same as weaponized public exploit code - treat POC availability as unconfirmed. No SSVC decision data was provided in the input. The main caveat: the limited-scope confidentiality impact and authentication requirement sharply constrain blast radius, so this is a patch-in-normal-cycle issue rather than an emergency, though GitLab's large install base means multi-tenant/public SaaS-style instances with many untrusted authenticated users should prioritize it higher.

An authenticated GitLab user (for example, a member of one group on a shared or public-signup instance) crafts a specifically structured GraphQL query that bypasses project-level authorization checks, causing the API to return sensitive fields from private projects the user is not a member of. Because the attack vector is network with low complexity and no user interaction, any logged-in account can attempt it directly against the GraphQL endpoint; no confirmed public exploit code is identified, though a HackerOne report documents the technique.