Linux
CVE-2024-53111
MEDIUM
Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionNVD
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mremap: fix address wraparound in move_page_tables()
On 32-bit platforms, it is possible for the expression len + old_addr < old_end to be false-positive if len + old_addr wraps around. old_addr is the cursor in the old range up to which page table entries have been moved; so if the operation succeeded, old_addr is the *end* of the old region, and adding len to it can wrap.
The overflow causes mremap() to mistakenly believe that PTEs have been copied; the consequence is that mremap() bails out, but doesn't move the PTEs back before the new VMA is unmapped, causing anonymous pages in the region to be lost. So basically if userspace tries to mremap() a private-anon region and hits this bug, mremap() will return an error and the private-anon region's contents appear to have been zeroed.
The idea of this check is that old_end - len is the original start address, and writing the check that way also makes it easier to read; so fix the check by rearranging the comparison accordingly.
(An alternate fix would be to refactor this function by introducing an "orig_old_start" variable or such.)
Tested in a VM with a 32-bit X86 kernel; without the patch:
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ cat test.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define ADDR1 ((void*)0x60000000)
#define ADDR2 ((void*)0x10000000)
#define SIZE 0x50000000uL
int main(void) {
unsigned char *p1 = mmap(ADDR1, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0);
if (p1 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap 1");
unsigned char *p2 = mmap(ADDR2, SIZE, PROT_NONE,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0);
if (p2 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap 2");
*p1 = 0x41;
printf("first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1);
unsigned char *p3 = mremap(p1, SIZE, SIZE,
MREMAP_MAYMOVE|MREMAP_FIXED, p2);
if (p3 == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mremap() failed; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1);
} else {
printf("mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p3);
}
}
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ gcc -static -o test test.c
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test
first char is 0x41
mremap() failed; first char is 0x00With the patch:
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test
first char is 0x41
mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x41AnalysisAI
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mremap: fix address wraparound in move_page_tables() On 32-bit platforms, it is possible for the expression `len + old_addr <. Rated medium severity (CVSS 5.5), this vulnerability is low attack complexity. This Integer Overflow vulnerability could allow attackers to cause unexpected behavior through arithmetic overflow.
Technical ContextAI
This vulnerability is classified as Integer Overflow (CWE-190), which allows attackers to cause unexpected behavior through arithmetic overflow. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mremap: fix address wraparound in move_page_tables() On 32-bit platforms, it is possible for the expression len + old_addr < old_end to be false-positive if len + old_addr wraps around. old_addr is the cursor in the old range up to which page table entries have been moved; so if the operation succeeded, old_addr is the *end* of the old region, and adding len to it can wrap. The overflow causes mremap() to mistakenly believe that PTEs have been copied; the consequence is that mremap() bails out, but doesn't move the PTEs back before the new VMA is unmapped, causing anonymous pages in the region to be lost. So basically if userspace tries to mremap() a private-anon region and hits this bug, mremap() will return an error and the private-anon region's contents appear to have been zeroed. The idea of this check is that old_end - len is the original start address, and writing the check that way also makes it easier to read; so fix the check by rearranging the comparison accordingly. (An alternate fix would be to refactor this function by introducing an "orig_old_start" variable or such.) Tested in a VM with a 32-bit X86 kernel; without the patch: ` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ cat test.c #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <err.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #define ADDR1 ((void*)0x60000000) #define ADDR2 ((void*)0x10000000) #define SIZE 0x50000000uL int main(void) { unsigned char *p1 = mmap(ADDR1, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p1 MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 1"); unsigned char *p2 = mmap(ADDR2, SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p2 MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 2"); *p1 = 0x41; printf("first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); unsigned char *p3 = mremap(p1, SIZE, SIZE, MREMAP_MAYMOVE|MREMAP_FIXED, p2); if (p3 == MAP_FAILED) { printf("mremap() failed; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); } else { printf("mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p3); } } user@horn:~/big_mremap$ gcc -static -o test test.c user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() failed; first char is 0x00 ` With the patch: ` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x41 ` Affected products include: Linux Linux Kernel.
RemediationAI
A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Validate arithmetic operations, use safe integer libraries, check bounds before allocation.
Same weakness CWE-190 – Integer Overflow or Wraparound
View allSame technique Buffer Overflow
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External POC / Exploit Code
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