Xapi CVE-2024-31144

LOW
Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere (CWE-829)
2025-02-14 [email protected]
3.8
CVSS 3.1

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Analysis Generated
Mar 28, 2026 - 18:26 vuln.today
Patch released
Mar 28, 2026 - 18:26 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Feb 14, 2025 - 21:15 nvd
LOW 3.8

DescriptionNVD

For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see:

https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview

Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs).

The metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata (e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another host).

Metadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but occurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must locate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata.

The metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order) each VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file present. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and is restored from.

In the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner, and should not be trusted by the host administrator.

A malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata backup.

A guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk has a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A guest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc.

AnalysisAI

For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see: https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual. Rated low severity (CVSS 3.8), this vulnerability is low attack complexity.

Technical ContextAI

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-829. For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see: https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs). The metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata (e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another host). Metadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but occurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must locate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata. The metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order) each VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file present. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and is restored from. In the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner, and should not be trusted by the host administrator. A malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata backup. A guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk has a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A guest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc. Affected products include: Xen Xapi.

RemediationAI

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.

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CVE-2024-31144 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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