Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessPosition malicious .LNK file on target system
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DeliveryVictim browses directory in Windows Explorer
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ExploitShell parses crafted shortcut icon metadata
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ExecutionTrigger buffer handling flaw
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PersistExecute arbitrary code at victim privilege level
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ImpactEstablish persistence or lateral movement
Vulnerability Assessment
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires victim to browse (view) a directory containing the malicious .LNK or .PIF file using Windows Explorer. No file opening or execution required - vulnerability triggers during automatic icon rendering when directory is displayed. Attack succeeds against default Windows configurations with standard icon preview enabled. Can be delivered remotely via network shares (SMB/WebDAV), removable media (USB drives), or email attachments that extract to local filesystem. User interaction required (UI:R in CVSS) but limited to normal file browsing behavior rather than explicit file execution. Local attack vector (AV:L) reflects execution context, though practical delivery often originates remotely via USB or network shares as demonstrated in Stuxnet campaign. No special privileges (PR:N) or non-default configurations required, affecting out-of-box Windows installations. |
| Impact | Critical real-world risk confirmed by multiple converging signals. CISA KEV listing confirms active exploitation in the wild during 2010. EPSS score of 92.13% (100th percentile) reflects historical widespread exploitation, though this represents 2010 attack patterns rather than current threat landscape. CVSS 7.8 with AV:L/UI:R suggests local attack vector requiring user interaction, but the Stuxnet campaign demonstrated practical remote exploitation via USB drives and network shares containing weaponized .LNK files that auto-execute when directories are viewed. Attack complexity is low (AC:L) with no privileges required (PR:N), making exploitation straightforward once malicious file is positioned. SSVC factors indicate confirmed exploitation (KEV), automatable delivery via removable media/shares, and high technical impact (arbitrary code execution). While Microsoft patched in August 2010 (MS10-046), legacy systems and air-gapped networks may remain vulnerable. Current prioritization should consider organizational exposure: critical for industrial control systems, legacy Windows environments, or networks accepting external media; lower for fully patched modern Windows 10/11 deployments. The historical Stuxnet association means this CVE remains referenced in threat intelligence for infrastructure targeting. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | Attacker creates weaponized USB drive or network share containing malicious .LNK file with embedded shellcode in icon metadata. When victim navigates to the directory in Windows Explorer, the shell automatically attempts to render the shortcut icon, triggering vulnerability without user needing to open or click the file. Malicious code executes with victim's privileges, establishing persistence or pivoting to additional targets. Stuxnet campaign used this technique to spread across air-gapped industrial networks via infected contractor USB drives, eventually reaching Siemens WinCC systems. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv2 – Apr 22, 2026
Remote code execution in Windows Shell across XP through Windows 7 via malicious .LNK or .PIF shortcut files automatically processed when displayed in Windows Explorer. Confirmed actively exploited (CISA KEV) in 2010 Stuxnet campaign targeting Siemens WinCC SCADA systems, with 92.13% EPSS score reflecting historical widespread exploitation. Public exploits available. Originally weaponized as zero-day before Microsoft MS10-046 patch release.
Earlier versions of this analysis (1)
A critical vulnerability in Windows Shell's handling of .LNK and .PIF shortcut files allows automatic code execution when Windows Explorer attempts to display the file's icon, without requiring the user to open the shortcut. This was the primary propagation vector for the Stuxnet worm.
RemediationAI
Apply Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-046 released August 2010, which patches the Windows Shell .LNK and .PIF parsing vulnerability across all affected Windows versions (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2010/ms10-046). For systems that cannot immediately patch, Microsoft advisory 2286198 provides registry-based workaround to disable display of shortcut icons, though this degrades user experience and does not eliminate risk if users open malicious shortcuts directly. Disable AutoRun/AutoPlay features for removable media and network shares to prevent automatic code execution when directories containing weaponized .LNK files are browsed, though this does not prevent exploitation if user manually browses to directories. Restrict WEBDAV Client service and disable icon display for remote shares. Block .LNK and .PIF files at email gateways and web proxies. For industrial control systems and air-gapped networks, implement strict USB device controls and media scanning before introduction to secured environments. These compensating controls reduce attack surface but cannot substitute for patching, as Windows Explorer icon rendering occurs during normal file browsing operations. Legacy systems unable to receive MS10-046 require isolation or decommissioning.
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Technical ContextAI · show details
Windows Shell is the Windows Explorer graphical interface component responsible for rendering desktop elements, file browsing, and shortcut file handling. This vulnerability exists in the icon display handler for .LNK (Windows shortcut) and .PIF (Program Information File) files. When Windows Explorer renders these files, the shell improperly parses specially crafted shortcut metadata, allowing embedded code execution without opening the file. Affects all Windows versions from XP SP3 through Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 across x86, x64, and Itanium architectures (per CPE data: windows_xp sp3, windows_vista sp1/sp2, windows_7, windows_server_2003 sp2, windows_server_2008 sp2/R2). The vulnerability was leveraged in conjunction with CVE-2010-2772 (Siemens WinCC default credentials) in the Stuxnet worm, marking one of the first major SCADA-targeting malware campaigns.
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Windows Shell in Microsoft Windows XP SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP1 and SP2, Server 2008 SP2 and R2, and Windows 7 allows local users or remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted (1) .LNK or (2) .PIF shortcut file, which is not properly handled during icon display in Windows Explorer, as demonstrated in the wild in July 2010, and originally reported for malware that leverages CVE-2010-2772 in Siemens WinCC SCADA systems.
Executive ViewAI
CVE-2010-2568 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Windows Shell that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code through malicious shortcut files (.LNK/.PIF) opened in Windows Explorer, confirmed actively exploited in the 2010 Stuxnet campaign targeting industrial control systems. Organizations still running unpatched Windows XP through Windows 7 systems face immediate risk of complete system compromise and lateral movement within critical infrastructure environments. This vulnerability has 92.1% exploitation probability and requires urgent patching across all affected legacy Windows deployments.
Apply vendor patch (Microsoft MS10-046: KB2286198 for XP, KB2219637 for Vista/7). Interim mitigations if patching delayed: block .LNK and .PIF file extensions at email gateways and network boundaries; disable AutoPlay/AutoRun features; restrict user permissions to prevent shortcut execution; implement network segmentation isolating legacy systems from critical infrastructure and external networks; monitor for suspicious shortcut file creation in user directories.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
Affected Products (CPE)CVE.org
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NVD
CVE.org
CISA KEV
EPSS
Exploit-DB
VulDB
GitHub PoC