In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Fix private hash use-after-free on resize poll_state_synchronize_rcu(mm->futex.phash.batches) is used by futex_ref_drop() to check that a grace period has passed since the current hash was published. This relies on batches referencing a grace period which started after the hash pointer was assigned. __futex_pivot_hash() sets mmph->batches before it replaces mmph->hash: scoped_guard(rcu) { mmph->batches = get_state_synchronize_rcu(); rcu_assign_pointer(mmph->hash, new); } The scoped_guard(rcu) doesn't stop new grace periods from starting, and if one starts between those two assignments, futex_ref_drop() can move forward while a reader still holds a pointer to the old hash. Fix things by setting mmph->batches after assigning mmph->hash. The scoped_guard(rcu) isn't needed, so let's drop that as well.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: guard dc_sink dereferences in MST mode validation dm_dp_mst_is_port_support_mode() reads aconnector->dc_sink->dsc_caps... for the DSC branch-throughput check, and get_conv_frl_bw()'s HDMI-PCON FRL-bandwidth path reads aconnector->dc_sink->edid_caps.max_frl_rate, both without a NULL check. dc_sink is cleared asynchronously on MST unplug, and both functions run from paths that the driver's own comments document as racing that teardown: the connector probe worker's ->mode_valid callback and a compositor's atomic check, neither of which holds the MST manager lock that the teardown path uses. The former does have an existing dsc_aux NULL check, but dsc_aux isn't reliably cleared in every path that clears dc_sink, so it doesn't cover this. Fail the port-support check and skip the FRL conversion path when the sink is already gone. (cherry picked from commit 7c3db8da4e039698ae198c870712428644e965c7)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: core: fix NULL pointer dereference in serial_core_unregister_port() port->port_dev is NULL when no port device is installed: it is cleared on teardown, and never set if registration failed before serial_core_port_device_add(). serial_core_unregister_port() passes it straight to serial_core_get_ctrl_dev(), which dereferences it: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047] RIP: serial_core_unregister_port Call Trace: serial8250_unregister_port serial8250_remove unbind_store Return early when there is no port device, and read port->port_dev under port_mutex. Also clear port->port_dev on the serial_core_register_port() error path, where the port device has already been removed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Update control fields on #VMEXIT if and only if VMRUN succeeded Leave control.erap_ctl and control.clean as-is in the VMCS if VMRUN fails, because as per AMD: there's no explicit architectural guarantee about the behavior in the presence of VMRUN failures. So the best thing to do would be to assume that if VMRUN fails, the actions requested in the control fields may not have been performed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Make the DP tunnel activation callback mandatory tb_tunnel_alloc_dp() takes an optional callback which is run from dprx_work once the DPRX capabilities read has completed. Without that callback tb_dp_dprx_start() reads the capabilities synchronously and never queues the work. It however always takes a tunnel reference which is only dropped by dprx_work itself or by tb_dp_dprx_stop() when cancel_delayed_work() actually canceled that work. That reference is thus leaked for every tunnel without a callback. The only tunnels without one are those from tb_tunnel_discover_dp(), which are activated again when restoring from hibernation. Pass the callback to tb_tunnel_discover_dp() as well and drop the synchronous path such that the DPRX capabilities are always read from dprx_work. Hibernation restore then also no longer blocks for up to 12 seconds while waiting for that read to complete. Also fix up the KUnit tests.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: drain and invalidate before server-side copy/clone cifs_file_copychunk_range() and the clone (FICLONE) path of cifs_remap_file_range() do not serialise the destination page cache against the server-side copy the way the other server-side range operations (smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_collapse_range() and smb3_insert_range()) do. cifs_file_copychunk_range() invalidates the destination range with filemap_invalidate_inode(), which takes and drops the mapping's invalidate_lock internally, so the lock is no longer held when the copychunk ioctl is issued. It also never drains in-flight netfs I/O on the target. The clone path never takes the invalidate_lock at all (only i_rwsem), uses a bare truncate_inode_pages_range() and likewise does not drain outstanding I/O. As a result an asynchronous destination writeback can complete after the server-side copy/clone has run and reinstate stale data over the region just written by the server, corrupting the file. This is the same class of corruption as commit d7d2adcd022b ("smb/client: flush dirty data before punching a hole") and has been seen randomly in generic/363 against Windows Server. Fix both paths to follow the established ordering: hold the target mapping's invalidate_lock across the flush and invalidation of the destination and the server ioctl, and call netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io() on the target to drain in-flight writes before the ioctl is issued. Only the target inode's invalidate_lock is required, as the source is merely flushed and not invalidated; i_rwsem (already held via lock_two_nondirectories()) is acquired before the invalidate_lock, matching the VFS lock ordering. Since filemap_invalidate_inode() takes that same lock internally, replace it with its own unmap/flush/invalidate steps instead of calling it, and return early on a zero-length copy to avoid a range underflow.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Add missing srcu in kvm_s390_set_irq_state() Like kvm_s390_inject_vcpu(), kvm_s390_set_irq_state() also needs the kvm->srcu or the slots lock when performing the Store status operation. Fix by taking kvm->srcu in kvm_s390_set_irq_state().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: drop dquot flush lock when we can't find a buffer to flush LOLLM noticed that xfs_qm_flush_one fails to drop the dquot flush lock if it can't grab the buffer associated with the dquot. Since there's no buffer, nobody else is going to drop the dqflock, so we need to do it ourselves.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: bound the logical key offset from persistent memory cache_key_decode() takes a key's logical off from the cache device and later indexes req_key_tree->subtrees[] by it in get_subtree(). An off past the device forms a subtree pointer outside the array, which rb_insert() writes through during replay. Reject a key of zero length, or whose off+len (computed in 64 bits) exceeds the device size, before it is used.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Re-pend GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES if getting said pages fails Re-pend GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES before exiting to userspace if getting the nested pages fails in the KVM_RUN path. If userspace re-runs the vCPU, and vmcs02 holds valid PFNs from the *previous* run of L2, then KVM could re-enter L2 with stale, unpinned PFNs mapped into e.g. the vAPIC page. Note, both SVM and VMX (as of commit 11722439fb20 ("KVM: nVMX: Ensure KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES is cleared on VM-Exit") ensure the request is cleared on VM-Exit (including the "forced" case), i.e. there is no risk of double-mapping due to emulated VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME/VMRUN *and* the request trying to map the nested pages.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: qcom: iris: fix runtime PM reference leaks Use pm_runtime_resume_and_get() in iris_enable_power_domains() to avoid leaking a runtime PM usage count on failure. Also ensure pm_runtime_put_sync() is always called in iris_disable_power_domains(), even when iris_opp_set_rate() fails, so runtime PM references remain balanced.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation IP-in-IP GSO can re-enter inet_gso_segment() or ipv6_gso_segment() for each nested IP header. encap_level tracks header bytes, not callback depth, so a deep chain can exhaust the kernel stack. Making inet_gso_segment() stackable introduced unbounded IPv4 nesting; IPIP GSO/TSO later made the path reachable. The IPv6 stackable path was introduced separately and uses the same guard. Count IPv4 and IPv6 GSO handler entries in skb_gso_cb, initialized once per top-level GSO operation and preserved across GRE/UDP context changes. Use the existing IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT for both handlers. The first five entries pass, and the sixth returns -EINVAL before dispatching another GSO callback.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/server: cancel async requests when closing connection An async request may still be waiting when a connection is closed. This can stop the connection from closing. Cancel active async requests before waiting for them to finish.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: prevent GCM nonce reuse on peer key changes TIPC can encrypt traffic between nodes using a different transmit key for each node. In this mode, the AES-GCM nonce for a packet sent to a known peer consists of a 32-bit prefix (a per-key salt XOR the peer's address) followed by a 64-bit counter. That counter is stored in the peer's RX crypto object. When the peer reports a change in which key it uses to receive packets, TIPC resets this counter. The sender can still be using the same TX key and salt, so subsequent packets reuse earlier nonces. This nonce reuse breaks confidentiality and exposes GCM's authentication key. This makes forgeries trivial: an attacker can exploit CTR malleability to alter captured ciphertexts and use the recovered authentication key to compute a valid tag for the modified ciphertext, under the same key and nonce. Use the TX key's existing aead->seqno counter instead. All encryptions using that key object share the same atomic counter, so concurrent encryptions get distinct nonce counter values. The counter survives key activation and peer reconnection, and peer key-status reports cannot reset it. This prevents those transitions from causing nonce reuse while the same TX key remains installed. The nonce format is unchanged, and receivers do not require consecutive counter values, so sharing the counter across peers remains compatible with existing receivers. A pre-existing check still invokes key revocation in the unlikely event that the counter wraps to zero.
`POST /{owner}/{repo}/topics` was registered without the sign-in middleware that provides the cross-origin protection, so a request issued by a third-party site was not rejected. A repository administrator who visited a malicious page could have the topics of their repository changed. No other repository settings were reachable through this route.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/cache: Introduce task_struct->sched_cache_grp to fix UAF Add a sched_cache_grp pointer to task_struct so that scheduler code can access the cache group directly via the task, without going through mm->sched_cache_grp. This decouples the scheduler's hot-path accesses from the mm_struct. Each task holds its own refcount on the sched_cache_group, separate from the reference held by its mm_struct. The reference is acquired in copy_mm() (fork) and exec_mmap() (exec), and released in exit_mm(). This fixes the use-after-free when account_mm_sched() reaches the group through a task whose mm is being switched, as reported by Hyunwoo: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/apPb-Dr4nPYuHQOK@v4bel/ Convert all scheduler code in fair.c and exit.c to use p->sched_cache_grp instead of p->mm->sched_cache_grp. Keep the fork/exec/exit reference management out of the generic mm paths: add sched_cache_fork(), sched_cache_fork_cleanup(), sched_cache_exec_mmap() and sched_cache_exit_mm() in kernel/sched/cache_sched.c (with empty stubs for !CONFIG_SCHED_CACHE), so fs/exec.c, kernel/fork.c and kernel/exit.c each call one helper instead of open-coding the refcounting under #ifdef. Also add sched_cache_group_get() and task_cache_group_get().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Don't run ops.dequeue() with a DSQ lock held ops.dequeue() is invoked with the source user DSQ's lock still held on the consume and move paths (scx_consume_dispatch_q(), move_task_between_dsqs()). A BPF scheduler which locks the source user DSQ from ops.dequeue() - e.g. by iterating it with bpf_iter_scx_dsq - self-deadlocks. ops.dequeue() can only call the "any" kfuncs and none of them can lock a builtin DSQ, so the global and bypass paths can't deadlock; however, all DSQ locks share one lockdep class, so iterating any user DSQ from ops.dequeue() on those paths trips the recursion check. Move the invocation after the DSQ unlock on all three paths. SCX_TASK_IN_CUSTODY is cleared under the lock serializing the transfer so that the callback is invoked exactly once.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Wait for SCX_OPSS_DISPATCHING before reenqueueing a task ebf1ccff79c4 ("sched_ext: Fix ops.dequeue() semantics") moved the final ops_state store in scx_dispatch_enqueue() after the DSQ unlock so that the custody update and ops.dequeue() precede it. A task can thus be found on a DSQ while still SCX_OPSS_DISPATCHING. The dequeue and core-sched pick paths wait for the state to clear in ops_dequeue() but the reenqueue paths don't. A reenqueue in that window runs ops.enqueue() and sets SCX_OPSS_QUEUED before the dispatch has completed. The dispatcher's final store then overwrites it with SCX_OPSS_NONE and finish_dispatch() drops every later dispatch of the task. Wait for SCX_OPSS_DISPATCHING to clear before dequeueing a task for reenqueue, the same way ops_dequeue() does.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fprobe: Use guard(rcu_sched_notrace) and check rcu_is_watching() unregister_fprobe() and unregister_fprobe_async() (used by BPF kprobe-multi) rely on standard RCU grace periods (synchronize_rcu() and call_rcu()) to wait until in-flight fprobe handlers complete before freeing the fprobe. However, if an fprobe handler executes while RCU is not watching (such as in the idle loop or nohz_full extended quiescent states), standard RCU does not track preemption-disabled sections. Consequently, synchronize_rcu() does not wait for those executions, which can lead to a use-after-free if the fprobe is freed immediately after unregistration. Ensure handlers exit early when !rcu_is_watching(). Furthermore, fprobe_fgraph_entry() and fprobe_ftrace_entry() previously used guard(rcu)() and rcu_read_lock(), which invoke lockdep on every hit under CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING. This adds overhead and can cause lockdep recursion if probed functions interact with lockdep. Since rhltable_lookup() and rhl_for_each_entry_rcu() use rcu_dereference_all_check() (which checks rcu_read_lock_any_held()), holding preemption disabled via rcu_read_lock_sched_notrace() is fully valid and sufficient so long as rcu_is_watching() is true. Define and use guard(rcu_sched_notrace)() across fprobe_ftrace_entry(), fprobe_fgraph_entry(), and fprobe_return(). This eliminates fast-path rcu_read_lock() and lockdep overhead while guaranteeing safe grace period synchronization.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: bpf: cast size to ssize_t when checking hid_bpf_hw_request As reported by Sashiko: If a transport driver encounters a hardware error and returns a negative error code such as -EPIPE, ret is implicitly promoted to size_t when compared against size. This causes the negative error code to evaluate as a large positive number, making the (ret > size) condition true. This silently converts the hardware error into a success return value and copies the unmodified buffer back, which could leave BPF programs operating on uninitialized or stale data. Fix this by casting size into ssize_t to return the actual negative error code.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-cgroup: save IRQ state in blkg_tryget_closest() bio_set_dev() associates the bio with a blkg through bio_associate_blkg(). If the blkg lookup misses, blkg_tryget_closest() takes q->queue_lock with spin_lock_irq() and releases it with spin_unlock_irq(), which unconditionally enables local interrupts. Callers may call bio_set_dev() with interrupts already disabled, e.g. dm-thin's pool_map() does so while holding pool->lock taken with spin_lock_irq(). The nested spin_unlock_irq() then enables interrupts while pool->lock is still held, so an I/O completion softirq can run on the same CPU, re-acquire pool->lock (thin_endio(), or overwrite_endio() -> complete_mapping_preparation()) and deadlock. lockdep reports this as inconsistent SOFTIRQ-ON-W to IN-SOFTIRQ-W usage. Commit 3a762de55b4e ("block: save irq state in blkg_lookup_create()") fixed the same problem while the lock lived in blkg_lookup_create(), but commit 9327a865e395 ("blk-cgroup: don't nest queue_lock under rcu in blkg_lookup_create()") moved the locking into blkg_tryget_closest() and reverted it to spin_lock_irq(). Save and restore the caller's IRQ state instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SDCA: Add better pm_runtime error handling in func probe Add a common error path in probe that balances the runtime PM reference.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Hold map BTF for the memory allocator destructor record bpf_ma_set_dtor() duplicates map->record so that the bpf_mem_alloc destructor can release the special fields of hash and rhash map elements once the allocator frees them for good. btf_record_dup() only acquires references on kernel and module BTF. Fields whose types live in the map BTF keep pointing into it: a kptr to a local type refers to map->btf, and a list_head or rb_root field carries a value_rec owned by the struct meta table of map->btf. That borrowed state can outlive the map. When RCU callbacks are still in flight, bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() copies the allocator and defers the final drain, together with the destructor context, to a workqueue. bpf_map_free() then frees map->record and drops the map's BTF reference as soon as map_free() returns. Once the program that loaded the BTF is gone as well, the BTF is freed while the worker still uses the duplicate. The worker dereferences it through btf_is_kernel() and btf_find_struct_meta() in bpf_obj_free_fields() when destroying elements that were freed under RCU, and through btf_is_kernel() in btf_record_free() when releasing the context itself: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btf_is_kernel+0x19/0x30 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88811505dce8 by task kworker/u16:2/50 Workqueue: events_unbound free_mem_alloc_deferred Call Trace: btf_is_kernel+0x19/0x30 btf_record_free+0xc7/0xf0 htab_dtor_ctx_free+0x1a/0x30 free_mem_alloc_no_barrier+0x39/0x230 free_mem_alloc_deferred+0x2a/0x40 process_scheduled_works+0x5ce/0x9d0 worker_thread+0x42a/0x5e0 kthread+0x1f5/0x230 ret_from_fork+0x1dd/0x390 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Allocated by task 358: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x287/0x510 btf_new_fd+0xf7/0x3d0 __sys_bpf+0x487/0x840 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x186/0x560 rcu_core+0x6f6/0xd40 Freeing a map that still holds more elements than the allocator's high watermark is enough to get there, because the bulk free during teardown queues the RCU callback that makes bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() defer. Non-preallocated hash maps and resizable hash maps both register the destructor and are affected alike. Keep one reference on the map BTF in the destructor context. Every non-kernel pointer in the duplicated record is either map->btf or memory owned by it, so a single reference covers kptrs, list heads, and rb roots, and mirrors what bpf_map_meta_alloc() does for the duplicated record of an inner map. Release it only after the duplicated record has been freed: the worker is preemptible and not in an RCU read-side critical section, so dropping the last reference first would let the BTF be freed while btf_record_free() still reads its fields.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix missing migration protection in __rhtab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch() bpf_mem_cache_free_rcu() uses this_cpu_ptr() which requires migration to be disabled. All callers of rhtab_delete_elem() disable migration except __rhtab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), which calls it under rcu_read_lock() only. On CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU, rcu_read_lock() does not disable preemption or migration, so the task can migrate between CPUs during the delete loop, causing this_cpu_ptr() to trigger: BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code Fix by wrapping the delete loop in migrate_disable()/migrate_enable() in __rhtab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), matching the migration protection that the other callers already provide.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binderfs: fix UAF write in binder_add_device binderfs_binder_device_create() publishes the new dentry with d_make_persistent() and then calls simple_done_creating(), which drops the parent directory lock and the creator's dentry reference. It then calls binder_add_device() to register the device in the global binder_devices list. After simple_done_creating() releases the parent directory lock, a concurrent unlinkat() can remove the new device entry. Dropping the creator's dentry reference can then trigger binderfs_evict_inode(), freeing the device. binder_add_device() later accesses the freed object, causing UAF write. Found by a modified Syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:1073 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_add_device+0xa9/0xc0 drivers/android/binder.c:7068 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88805b340c00 by task syz.1.532/11389 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11389 Comm: syz.1.532 Not tainted 7.2.0 #4 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595 hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:1073 [inline] binder_add_device+0xa9/0xc0 drivers/android/binder.c:7068 binderfs_binder_device_create.isra.0+0x724/0x990 drivers/android/binderfs.c:196 binder_ctl_ioctl+0x186/0x1b0 drivers/android/binderfs.c:241 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff9027a833d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff903674018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff902a35fa0 RCX: 00007ff9027a833d RDX: 0000200000000500 RSI: 00000000c1086201 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ff902850733 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff902a36038 R14: 00007ff902a35fa0 R15: 00007ffd7166bfa0 </TASK> Allocated by task 11389: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2e4/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:5489 _kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:988 [inline] _kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1309 [inline] binderfs_binder_device_create.isra.0+0x17a/0x990 drivers/android/binderfs.c:148 binder_ctl_ioctl+0x186/0x1b0 drivers/android/binderfs.c:241 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 11389: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2677 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:6377 [inline] kfree+0x2fc/0x6e0 mm/slub.c:6692 binderf ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Nullify "have run CPUs" mask pointer when freeing it Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn't have to subtly use sev->active to track whether or not the mask has been freed. As pointed out by Sashiko, blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails. Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n. Deliberately don't use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it's not directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous. Furthermore, while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted side effect, KVM absolutely relies on '0' being the "null" value given that the struct is zero-allocated. Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Do cache maintenance on the source VM *before* clearing SEV state Explicitly flush caches after intra-host migration before clearing "SEV active" on the source VM, as doing cache maintenance afterwards creates a tiny window where memory reclaim could return memory to the host without performing a cache flush, e.g. as pointed out by Sashiko: CPU1 in sev_migrate_from(): src->active = false; CPU2 running concurrent unmap: Since active is false, the automatic cache flush in sev_guest_memory_reclaimed is skipped. The host frees and reallocates the page. CPU1 in sev_migrate_from(): sev_writeback_caches(src_kvm); Executes a hardware cache flush (wbnoinvd), which writes the guest's old dirty ciphertext over the new page owner's data.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic: Take a refcount on IRQs referenced by last_lr_irq Referencing the last interrupt inserted in an LR is rather fragile, as this interrupt can vanish if a concurrently unmapped LPI. Solve this by bumping up the refcount on the interrupt when populating last_lr_irq, and drop it at vgic_prune_ap_list() time, when LPIs are being reclaimed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Fix NULL dereference in tb_remove_work() There is a slight race between tb_remove_work() and tb_domain_remove() which leads to dereferencing a NULL tb->root_switch pointer inside tb_free_unplugged_xdomains(): Thread A Thread B tb_remove_work() tb_domain_remove() mutex_lock(&tb->lock) tb_stop() /* doesn't cancel a running callback */ cancel_delayed_work(&tcm->remove_work) ... tb_switch_remove(tb->root_switch) tb->root_switch = NULL mutex_unlock(&tb->lock) mutex_lock(&tb->lock) ... /* without checking ->root_switch */ tb_free_unplugged_xdomains(tb->root_switch) mutex_unlock(&tb->lock) Commit a8937f35cf39 ("thunderbolt: Remove XDomain from the bus without holding tb->lock") doesn't seem right to move tb_free_unplugged_xdomains() out of the &tb->lock section and the check for tb->root_switch, in particular. It states: For this reason separate removing the XDomain from the topology data structures (where we need the lock) from unregistering the device from the bus (where remove callbacks of the drivers are being called). tb_free_unplugged_xdomains() belongs to the former group of functions requiring the lock. And it also calls tb_xdomain_remove() which should only be called with &tb->lock held. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: frequency: adf4377: Fully initialize clk_init_data and clk_parent_data The clk_init_data structure contains several mutually-exclusive members for different methods to specify the possible parents of a clock, prompting drivers to initialize only the members they need. However, not initializing all members may cause subtle issues, which are only exposed when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN or CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE is enabled. adf4377_clk_register() fills in init.parent_data, and assumes that init.parent_names is NULL. However, the latter is uninitialized, and thus may cause a crash. Similarly, adf4377_clk_register() fills in only parent_data.fw_name, leaving other members of the clk_parent_data structure uninitialized. Make sure all members are fully initialized, to fix such bugs, and to avoid future breakage when converting drivers to a different method for specifying the parents.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix _gaccess_shadow_fault() In some circumstances, it is possible that the page of nested guest memory that is being shadowed is not present at all in the parent guest gmap. dat_entry_walk() will not find any leaf entry and return with -ENOENT, which will erroneously be propagated all the way to userspace. Fix by manually calling gmap_link() on the memory of the nested guest that is being shadowed if the mapping was not already present.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Properly handle NULL pointer in dat_cond_set_storage_key() Some callers pass NULL as oldkey. Calling page_cond_set_storage_key() will cause that NULL pointer to get dereferenced. Fix by checking for NULL and assigning the pointer to a dummy local variable to avoid crashes.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix potential races in dat skey functions When dat_cond_set_storage_key() finds a large page, it will conditionally set the storage key in absolute memory using large_crste_to_phys() to get the absolute address. There is a race window between dat_entry_walk() and large_crste_to_phys(): the large page could have been split concurrently, and large_crste_to_phys() might be called with a crste that does not designate a large page, leading to crashes. Similar issues were also present in dat_set_storage_key(). dat_get_storage_key() and dat_reset_reference_bit() did instead check for a potential concurrent splitting of the large page, but then handled it incorrectly. Fix by performing a READ_ONCE on the crste pointer, checking and using the result, instead of dereferencing the pointer again. In case a race is detacted, try dat_entry_walk() again.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix race in _destroy_pages_crste() Use READ_ONCE() in _destroy_pages_crste() to read the crste, avoid dereferencing the pointer multiple times.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: winwing: fix use-after-free in force feedback teardown winwing_init_ff() passes the driver's private data, allocated with devm_kzalloc() in winwing_probe(), as the effect context to input_ff_create_memless(). The memoryless force-feedback core takes ownership of that pointer and frees it with kfree() from input_ff_destroy() (ml_ff_destroy()) when the input device is destroyed. Freeing a devm-managed allocation with kfree() is an invalid free, and the same object is then released again by devres when the HID device is torn down, a double free. As the allocation also embeds the LED class devices, their timers and work item live on freed memory and the slab gets corrupted. This triggers on unbind, rmmod, hot-unplug and on system suspend, where the firmware cache walks the now-corrupt devres list. KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: invalid-free in input_ff_destroy Allocated by task N: winwing_probe Pass NULL as the memless context instead and fetch the driver data from the input device in winwing_play_effect(): the HID core already stores the hid_device as the input device's drvdata. The force-feedback core then owns nothing that it must not free.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: block: Fix zones_cond out-of-bounds write on zone report blk_revalidate_disk_zones() sizes the zones_cond array from the disk capacity and zone size, but the index used by blk_revalidate_zone_cond() comes from the device-driven report_zones() walk and is never checked against the array size. A device reporting more zones than fit the array makes blk_zone_set_cond() write out of bounds. One way to reach this is a zone count exceeding 32 bits: both blk_revalidate_zone_args.nr_zones and struct zoned_disk_info.nr_zones are unsigned int, so a disk advertising more than UINT_MAX zones (e.g. 2^32 + 1024 zones of one 512-byte logical block) gets its zone count truncated to a small value, undersizing the array while the report walk keeps counting upward. Check the index against the array size before storing the zone condition, and refuse to revalidate when the zone count does not fit 32 bits.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Preserve packet pointer class displacement in regsafe() regsafe() maps packet pointer IDs between states and checks that each current register range is a subset of the corresponding explored register range. It does not, however, preserve the displacement between registers that share a packet pointer ID. This is unsound because packet range is shared by ID. A bounds check on one class member updates every member, and a later access can consume the range through another member. Commit 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers") folded the fixed pointer offset into r64 and removed the old off equality check, so two individually narrower registers can prune even when their displacement has changed. The explored path can then license an out-of-bounds packet access on the pruned path. Require matching range bases for packet pointers with an ID. Together with the existing ID mapping, this preserves the displacement between members of each packet-pointer class without adding per-ID state. Packet pointers without an ID remain unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethtool: keep rtnl_lock for the ioctl self test An offline self test that brings the interface down and back up with netif_close() / netif_open() requires rtnl_lock for both. Since the ethtool IOCTL path became rtnl-optional for ops-locked drivers, the ETHTOOL_TEST ioctl runs holding only the netdev instance lock, so on an ops-locked driver the self test now tears the device down without rtnl_lock. With lockdep this reproduces deterministically on every offline self test on such a driver; note the sole lock held is the instance lock, not rtnl: WARNING: suspicious RCU usage net/core/netpoll.c:207 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! 1 lock held by ethtool/107: #0: (&dev->lock){+.+.}, at: dev_ethtool Call Trace: netpoll_poll_disable __dev_close_many netif_close_many netif_close fbnic_self_test dev_ethtool_locked dev_ethtool dev_ioctl sock_ioctl __x64_sys_ioctl Without lockdep the same condition trips ASSERT_RTNL() in __dev_close_many() / __dev_open(); that check only samples the global rtnl state, so it can be masked by a concurrent rtnl holder, but the device is still being reconfigured without the lock it requires. The ethtool self_test is a legacy ioctl-only command, so an ETHTOOL_TEST case is only needed on the ioctl path. Add an opt-in bit for drivers whose self test needs rtnl_lock and set it on the ops-locked drivers whose offline self test tears the interface down and up: - fbnic (ops-locked via queue_mgmt_ops): fbnic_self_test() offline path uses netif_close() / netif_open(). - bnxt (ops-locked via queue_mgmt_ops): bnxt_self_test() offline path goes through bnxt_close_nic() / bnxt_half_open_nic() / bnxt_half_close_nic() / bnxt_open_nic(), which close and reopen the device.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame() While rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb->len is at least sizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame with an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2). When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives: 1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false). 2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3. 3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns NULL without advancing skb->data. 4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled 3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0. Fix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firewire: cdev: fix back-transition for iso_resource_auto client resource The todo member of iso_resource_auto structure represents the state of the client resource and normally transitions in the following order: ISO_RES_AUTO_ALLOC -> ISO_RES_AUTO_REALLOC -> ISO_RES_AUTO_DEALLOC However, concurrent access from the work item and the file descriptor release function can cause the state to transition backwards from ISO_RES_AUTO_DEALLOC to ISO_RES_AUTO_REALLOC. Prevent the back-transition by checking the current state before updating it in the work item.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: size a connection's path set by the transport it ends up with __rds_conn_create() computes npaths from the caller's transport before it decides whether a connection to one of the host's own addresses is to be handled by the loopback transport instead. That substitution is what an RDS/TCP socket sending to a local address gets, and after it the path init loop still runs for the TCP transport's RDS_MPATH_WORKERS paths and allocates an ordered workqueue for each, while rds_loop_conn_alloc() only ever provides transport data for path 0. rds_conn_destroy() sizes its teardown from c_trans, by then the loopback transport, so it visits path 0 only - and rds_conn_path_destroy() would skip the other paths anyway, since it returns before destroy_workqueue() for a path without transport data. kfree(c_path) then drops the last pointers to seven workqueues. That repeats for every such connection, on every netns teardown or module unload, and every distinct local destination address is a separate connection. Recompute npaths once the transport is final, so that creation and destruction agree on the set of paths. The c_path array stays sized for the caller's transport; the unused entries are freed with it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gve: DQO: fix header length used by gve_can_send_tso() for UDP GSO gve_can_send_tso() computes how many buffers each segment of a GSO packet would span, and for this it needs the length of the headers that the device replicates in front of every segment. It unconditionally uses skb_tcp_all_headers(), which reads the doff field of the TCP header. SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 packets have no TCP header: tcp_hdrlen() then reads one byte of the UDP payload, and header_len can be anything in [0, 60] instead of the transport offset plus the eight bytes of the UDP header that gve_prep_tso() programs into the TSO context descriptor. A wrong header length shifts all the segment boundaries computed in the loop, so the number of buffers per segment can be over or under estimated. In the first case, GSO is needlessly disabled for this packet by gve_features_check_dqo() and the stack has to segment it. In the second case, the driver hands the device a packet whose segments span more than GVE_TX_MAX_DATA_DESCS buffers. Use the UDP header length for SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 packets, matching what gve_prep_tso() does.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fprobe: Terminate the fgraph_data list when the reservation is not filled fprobe_fgraph_entry() reserves shadow stack space for every fprobe with an exit handler, but only fills it for those whose entry handler returns 0. fgraph_reserve_data() does not clear the area, so fprobe_return() parses the unused tail as headers left over from an earlier call, and an exit handler can run twice or despite its entry handler asking to skip it. Write a zero word after the last entry to terminate the walk. A zeroed slot does not decode to a NULL fprobe on the arches that encode the header into one unsigned long, since arch_decode_fprobe_header_fp() ORs in FPROBE_HEADER_MSB_PATTERN, so make read_fprobe_header() return NULL for a zeroed slot.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kprobes: Fix permanent hang when flushing the kprobe optimizer Writing 0 to /proc/sys/debug/kprobes-optimization while a kprobe is jump-optimized never returns. The writer sleeps in D state forever with kprobe_sysctl_mutex held, so any later read or write of that sysctl hangs as well. For example, with vfs_read+9 as an optimizable address in this build: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 'p:myprobe vfs_read+9' >> kprobe_events # echo 1 > events/kprobes/myprobe/enable # # wait until /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/list shows [OPTIMIZED] # echo 0 > /proc/sys/debug/kprobes-optimization INFO: task sh:246 blocked for more than 10 seconds. Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x1176/0x4f70 schedule+0xdc/0x2c0 schedule_timeout+0x17b/0x260 wait_for_completion+0x173/0x3c0 wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked+0xbc/0x130 proc_kprobes_optimization_handler+0x156/0x1b0 proc_sys_call_handler+0x324/0x490 vfs_write+0x52d/0xfe0 ksys_write+0xff/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> ... INFO: task cat:265 is blocked on a mutex likely owned by task sh:246. wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked() reinitializes optimizer_completion, asks the optimizer thread to flush and sleeps in wait_for_completion(). The thread drains the (un)optimizing lists, but calls complete() only if completion_done() is true, i.e. if the completion is already done, which never happens while someone waits. disarm_all_kprobes() and kprobe_trace_self_tests_init() wait the same way. Calling complete() unconditionally would not be enough: the waiter drops kprobe_mutex while it sleeps, and nothing else serializes the sysctl handler against the debugfs "enabled" file. A second flusher that still finds the lists non-empty, e.g. because a disabled probe is queued for unoptimizing, reinitializes the completion under the first: sysctl write debugfs "enabled" write unoptimize_all_kprobes() wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked() init_completion(c) mutex_unlock(&kprobe_mutex) wait_for_completion(c) disarm_all_kprobes() wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked() init_completion(c) // c->wait is reset, the first // waiter is off the queue mutex_unlock(&kprobe_mutex) wait_for_completion(c) kprobe_optimizer() complete(c) // wakes the debugfs writer only where c is &optimizer_completion. Lining up the two writes during an optimizer pass loses the sysctl writer this way. Replace the completion with a counter of optimizer passes, bumped at the end of each pass and signalled with wake_up_var_locked(), both under kprobe_mutex. A flusher samples the count and waits with wait_var_event_mutex(), which drops kprobe_mutex only while sleeping, so a new count means a whole pass ran in the meantime. Nothing is reinitialized, so several flushers can sleep in the wait at once.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-oxp: use cancel_delayed_work_sync() in remove oxp_hid_remove() uses cancel_delayed_work() for all three delayed work items. cancel_delayed_work() only dequeues a pending work item without waiting for a currently executing callback to finish. If any of the work callbacks (oxp_rgb_queue_fn, oxp_btn_queue_fn, oxp_mcu_init_fn) is running at the time of removal, the callback continues executing concurrently with hid_hw_close() and hid_hw_stop(), accessing the HID device after it has been closed and stopped. Use cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead to ensure that any in-progress work callback completes before device teardown proceeds.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Keep internal commands dispatchable during error handling Commit 08b12cda6c44 ("scsi: ufs: core: Switch to scsi_get_internal_cmd()") switched UFS internal commands to allocate requests on hba->host->pseudo_sdev->request_queue, which shares the host tagset with regular LUNs. During error recovery, ufshcd_err_handling_prepare() calls blk_mq_quiesce_tagset(&hba->host->tag_set), marking all queues in the tagset as quiesced, including pseudo_sdev->request_queue. When ufshcd_verify_dev_init() subsequently issues internal commands (e.g. NOP OUT UPIU) via blk_execute_rq(), blk_mq_run_hw_queue() skips running the quiesced queue, resulting in an unrecoverable circular wait deadlock. Keep quiescing the tagset and unquiesce the pseudo SCSI device on top of that, so internal commands stay dispatchable while the logical units remain quiesced. Re-quiesce the pseudo device before unquiescing the tagset so that quiesce_depth stays balanced. Clock scaling and ufshcd_pause_command_processing() are unaffected: they keep quiescing the whole tagset, internal commands included.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Don't WARN on an unknown VM ioctl in protected mode kvm_pkvm_ioctl_allowed() WARNs when kvm_get_cap_for_kvm_ioctl() doesn't find the ioctl number in vm_ioctl_caps[], and kvm_arch_vm_ioctl() calls it for every number the generic code doesn't handle, so ioctl(vm_fd, 0xdeadbeef) from userspace taints a pKVM host and panics it under panic_on_warn. The lookup is fed userspace input: return false, and userspace gets the -EINVAL kvm_arch_vm_ioctl() returns for that number on a host without pKVM.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Derive SCX_RQ_IN_WAKEUP from the core enqueue flags schedule_deferred_locked() skips scheduling a deferred action while SCX_RQ_IN_WAKEUP is set and relies on the task_woken_scx() call that follows a wakeup enqueue to run it. enqueue_task_scx() sets the flag from the merged enqueue flags, which include the flags stashed for a remote activation. move_remote_task_to_local_dsq() thus sets SCX_RQ_IN_WAKEUP on the destination rq when the moved task was woken up, although no task_woken_scx() follows that activation. An IMMED insert into a busy destination requests a local reenqueue during that enqueue. The request gets linked but not scheduled and stays pending until an unrelated wakeup or preemption on that CPU runs the deferred actions. The IMMED task sits behind the running task in the meantime. If nothing runs them before the scheduler is disabled, the request outlives the scheduler and points into its freed per-cpu area, which the next scheduler dereferences from run_deferred(). Test the core enqueue flags for the wakeup bit. Only the core's wakeup path is followed by task_woken_scx().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: options: fix uninit-value in mptcp_write_data_fin When sending a DATA_FIN without data, and because the DATA_FIN occupies 1 octet of the connection-level sequence space [1], it is then required to add a DSS mapping with specific values. If the checksum has been negotiated, it also needs to be computed, and included in the outgoing packet, and thus the initial csum data needs to be reset to 0 as well. This is no longer the case since commit cfcceb7a39fc ("tcp: shrink per-packet memset in __tcp_transmit_skb()"), because the whole ext_copy structure is no longer zeroed by default. This seems to be the only case where use_map is changed and set afterwards, so initialising the csum field only in this case, along with other fields for this specific case.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: Check range in proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_minmax Add the range check to do_proc_int_conv_ms_jiffies_minmax that commit d174174c6776 ("sysctl: replace SYSCTL_INT_CONV_CUSTOM macro with functions") incorrectly removed.