In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Release current IOAS on xa_store() failure iommufd_take_all_iova_rwsem() takes an object reference and the iova_rwsem write lock before storing the IOAS in the temporary ioas_list xarray. If xa_store() fails, the current IOAS has not been inserted into ioas_list yet. iommufd_release_all_iova_rwsem() only unwinds IOAS objects already present in that xarray, so it cannot release the current IOAS. Release the current IOAS rwsem and object reference before unwinding the previously stored entries.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Don't hex dump attribute security buffer set_attribute() populates the security area of the BIOS attribute request buffer with the current admin password via populate_security_buffer(), then dumps the whole request buffer with print_hex_dump_bytes(). This can expose the plaintext admin password in the kernel log. The same issue was fixed for the password attribute path by commit d1a196e0a6dc ("platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Don't hex dump plaintext password data"). Remove the remaining dump from the BIOS attribute path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: ISST: Add a NULL check for sst_inst[] To be consistent with other places, add a NULL check for failed socket loading by checking isst_common.sst_inst[].
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: ISST: Validate logical CPU id and clos id Validate max CLOS ID and logical CPU ID for core power feature. Reject any clos level or logical CPU number greater than the supported maximum. These are used to calculate MMIO offset.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: int1092: Fix potential memory leak in sar_probe() The memory allocated for device_mode_info in parse_package() called by sar_get_data() is not freed in some of the error paths in sar_probe(). Fix that by converting to use device managed allocations.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: think-lmi: Free system certificate signatures Multi-certificate support also allows the system authentication object to store ->signature and ->save_signature, which leak when the driver is removed. Free the signatures to avoid leaking memory.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix heap OOB read in sk_store() and kek_store() sk_store() and kek_store() strip a trailing newline from the sysfs write before allocating the key buffer: length = count; if (buf[length - 1] == '\n') length--; bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = kmemdup(buf, length, GFP_KERNEL); but then pass the original "count" (not "length") as the copy size to hp_wmi_perform_query(), which memcpy()s that many bytes out of the "length"-sized allocation, reading one byte past it whenever the write ends in a newline, the normal case for a shell "echo" into sysfs. KASAN confirms this directly: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hp_wmi_perform_query+0x1e9/0x460 [hp_bioscfg] Read of size 28 at addr ffff88813c8e2b80 by task python3/16022 ... sk_store+0xa7/0x240 [hp_bioscfg] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3e1/0x5d0 ... The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 27-byte region [ffff88813c8e2b80, ffff88813c8e2b9b) Reproduced identically for kek_store, and at multiple write sizes (28, 57, 201 bytes), each time reading exactly one byte past a kmemdup() allocation one byte smaller than the write. Fix by passing "length" instead of "count" to hp_wmi_perform_query() in both functions.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix heap OOB read on empty password write validate_password_input() computes length = strlen(buf) and then checks buf[length - 1] to strip a trailing newline, without checking that length is nonzero first. Writing an empty string (a bare '\n') to current_password or new_password gives length == 0, and buf[length - 1] reads buf[-1], one byte before the heap allocation holding the copied input. KASAN confirms this directly: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88811bd8da9f by task sh/13740 ... store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg] current_password_store+0x14/0x20 [hp_bioscfg] ... The buggy address is located 23 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff88811bd8da80, ffff88811bd8da88) Reproduced identically via new_password_store. Execution continues past the bad read (the garbage byte only affects whether "length" is decremented by one), so the write completes and returns success; this is a pure information read past the buffer, not a crash, but it is still an out-of-bounds access KASAN correctly flags. Fix by only checking buf[length - 1] when length is nonzero.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/query: cap user size passed to copy_struct_to_user io_handle_query_entry() clamps hdr.size for the inbound copy_from_user() but keeps the original user value as usize. copy_struct_to_user() uses that usize and, when it is larger than the kernel result, clear_user()s the trailing bytes. As hdr.size is a __u32, a query can request nearly 4 GiB of zeroing, including on the error path where res_size stays 0. The interface is reachable without a ring via IORING_REGISTER_QUERY. Reject sizes larger than PAGE_SIZE, as recommended for copy_struct_* interfaces.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phylink: correctly validate returned PCS in phylink_inband_caps In phylink_inband_caps(), the PCS returned by mac_select_pcs is only checked if NULL but mac_select_pcs can also return an error pointer. This can cause a kernel panic as phylink_pcs_inband_caps() only checks if passed PCS is not NULL and directly dereference ops from the phylink_pcs struct. Use the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to address both case where the returned PCS can be NULL or an error pointer and prevent a kernel panic.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Release the Rx HopID that was handed out on mismatch tb_xdomain_alloc_in_hopid() passes the wanted HopID to ida_alloc_range() as the lower bound, so a taken id is not an error there: the allocator returns the next free one above it. tbnet_connected_work() asks for the peer's transmit path, treats any other id as a failure and returns without releasing what it got, so that allocation stays live for the rest of the XDomain connection with nothing left holding a reference to it. Release the id when it is not the one we asked for, the same way the error unwind at the end of the function releases the expected one.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: ntb_transport: Fail TX enqueue when the QP link is down Commit f195a1a6fe41 ("ntb: Drop packets when qp link is down") meant to make ntb_transport_tx_enqueue() drop packets submitted while the QP link is down, but it only returns 0 without consuming the packet. Zero means success by this function's contract, so ntb_netdev reports NETDEV_TX_OK and forgets the skb: nothing queued it, nothing frees it, and it leaks, one skb for every transmit racing a link-down. Return -ENOLINK instead, restoring the contract that a non-zero return leaves the buffer owned by the caller. With the preceding patch, ntb_netdev frees the skb on non-retryable enqueue failures and returns NETDEV_TX_OK, so a packet racing with link-down is dropped without leaking or entering a busy retry loop.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: do not dereference an unset send buffer on the SMC-D teardown path smc_close_stream_wait() calls smc_tx_prepared_sends() from inside its sk_wait_event() condition, and sk_wait_event() evaluates that condition once with the socket lock released. smcd_buf_detach() clears conn->sndbuf_desc from smc_conn_kill() under lock_sock(), so a link group terminating while a socket waits there leaves the helper dereferencing NULL, faulting out of close(). SIOCOUTQ reads the field by hand, and smc_close_cancel_work() drops the lock across two cancel_*_sync() calls. Sample the pointer once in the helper, report nothing prepared while it is unset, and bound the ioctl the same way. The receive tasklet dereferences the field directly in smc_cdc_msg_recv_action(), not through this helper; 1/2 is what keeps it from running that late.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: sm501: Fix potential memory leaks during remove The memory allocated for struct sm501_devdata in sm501_pci_probe() and sm501_plat_probe() is not freed by the corresponding remove functions sm501_pci_remove() and sm501_plat_remove(). Fix that by adding a call to kfree().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler() forwards a MIDI event using a length byte the device supplies, with no bound and no check that the transfer delivered that many bytes: if (!urb->status) { if (rt->receiver_buffer[0] == 0x10) /* midi in event */ if (midi_rt) midi_rt->in_received(midi_rt, rt->receiver_buffer + 2, rt->receiver_buffer[1]); } receiver_buffer is a 64-byte kzalloc() buffer (COMM_RECEIVER_BUFSIZE), so only 62 bytes follow the two-byte header. receiver_buffer[1] is a u8 the device chooses, so a device that answers with 0x10 and a length of 0xFF makes snd_rawmidi_receive() read 255 bytes starting two bytes into a 64-byte object. The bytes past the buffer are handed to userspace through the rawmidi read path. urb->actual_length is not consulted either, so a short transfer leaves both the type byte and the length byte at their previous values and the handler acts on stale data. The receiver URB is submitted from usb6fire_comm_init() at probe, so the read happens on plug with no user action; forwarding to userspace also needs a MIDI input substream open, since usb6fire_midi_in_received() only calls snd_rawmidi_receive() when rt->in is set. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), single packet from an emulated device: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snd_rawmidi_receive Read of size 255 at addr ffff000009f64682 by task bash/183 __asan_memcpy snd_rawmidi_receive usb6fire_midi_in_received [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler [snd_usb_6fire] Allocated by task 11: usb6fire_comm_init [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_chip_probe [snd_usb_6fire] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000009f64680, ffff000009f646c0) Reject the event when the length exceeds the bytes that follow the header, and require the transfer to have delivered the header plus that many bytes. The receiver URB is submitted with a 64-byte transfer_buffer_length, so a genuine device cannot deliver an event longer than those 62 bytes and nothing valid is dropped. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aloop: Check card index validity at probe aloop driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: mpu401: Check card index validity at probe mpu401 driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: mts64: Check card index validity at probe Although mts64 driver has a check of the given devptr->id value, it doesn't check for a negative id, which is often given as "none" or such value when bound via sysfs. This may lead to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: portman2x4: Check card index validity at probe Although portman2x4 driver has a check of the given devptr->id value, it doesn't check for a negative id, which is often given as "none" or such value when bound via sysfs. This may lead to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: serial-u16550: Check card index validity at probe serial-u16550 driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: virmidi: Check card index validity at probe virmidi driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters. Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a value out of the range.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-stats: fix a crash if allocation of per-cpu data fails If "dm_kvzalloc(percpu_alloc_size, cpu_to_node(cpu))" fails, the code jumps to the "out" label and calls dm_stat_free. dm_stat_free does "for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { dm_kvfree(s->stat_percpu[cpu][0].histogram, s->histogram_alloc_size);", which crashes with NULL pointer dereference if s->stat_percpu[cpu] is NULL. This commit fixes the bug by testing s->stat_percpu[cpu] for NULL before using it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate on-media seg_num against the cache device size seg_num is read from the crc32c-only superblock, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls it. It sizes cache->segments[] and is the value every later on-media segment id is bounded against, yet it is never checked against the device. Because cache_dev->mapping is the direct map of the pmem, CACHE_DEV_SEGMENT() for a segment id past the device resolves to ordinary kernel memory beyond the mapping; a new-cache init reaching such an id has cache_seg_init() -> cache_dev_zero_range() memset() 12 KiB over that memory -- an out-of-bounds write into the kernel heap at table load. A zero seg_num makes the segment allocations ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Reject a seg_num that is zero, larger than the device can hold, or larger than PCACHE_CACHE_SEGS_MAX before it is used.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: detect a cycle in the last-kset chain during replay cache_replay() follows the on-media last-kset chain by next_cache_seg_id with no cond_resched(). A forged chain that points back into a segment it has already visited makes the replay loop follow it forever. Cap the last-kset hops at cache->n_segs; a valid chain visits each segment at most once.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: only hand out initialized cache segments get_cache_segment() scans the segment map up to cache->n_segs, the physical device segment count, but cache_segs_init() only initializes the first cache_info->n_segs segments. A crafted image with cache_info->n_segs smaller than the device count leaves the remaining pcache_cache_segment structs zeroed (segment.data == NULL), and the allocator can hand one to cache_kset_close(), which writes through the returned segment's data pointer with no NULL check. Bound the allocator's search to cache_info->n_segs so only initialized segments are ever returned. A conforming cache sets n_segs equal to the device segment count, so this rejects nothing legitimate.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: svc: bound IBI payload to the requested max_payload_len svc_i3c_master_handle_ibi() reads the IBI payload from the RX FIFO into the IBI slot. The loop is bounded by the hardware FIFO size (SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE), not by the slot size. slot->data points into the IBI pool, which i3c_generic_ibi_alloc_pool() sizes at max_payload_len per slot. svc_i3c_master_request_ibi() only rejects a max_payload_len larger than SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE, so a driver can request a smaller one. mctp-i3c requests 1. Each readsb() then copies the controller RXCOUNT bytes (up to 31) with no check against the slot size. A device that sends more bytes than the slot holds writes past slot->data, an out-of-bounds write into the IBI pool. Bound the loop by dev->ibi->max_payload_len and clamp each read to the space left in the slot, the same way dw-i3c does. A device can still send more than the requested payload. Flush the leftover bytes from the RX FIFO so they do not leak into the next transfer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring The fuse-io-uring transport copies req->in.h out to the ring in fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req->out.h back in fuse_uring_commit(). Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache (fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and panics: usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'fuse_request' (offset 56, size 40)! kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90) Call Trace: __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268) __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223) copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618) fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785) fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306) tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96) task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233) io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84) io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278) __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches stack memory, not the slab object.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8192du: Fix possible memory leak in rtl92du_init_sw_vars() The memory allocated inside rtl92du_init_shared_data() is not freed in any of the subsequent error paths in rtl92du_init_sw_vars(). Fix that by adding a call to rtl92du_deinit_shared_data() in the error path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: Fix potential memory leak in rtw_txq_push_skb() The skb passed to the rtw_hci_tx_write() is expected to be freed when the function fails, but the error path in rtw_txq_push_skb() does not free the skb before returning. This can lead to a memory leak in rtw_txq_push() where a dequeued skb is passed to rtw_txq_push_skb().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: pci: fix resource leak on failed NAPI setup rtw_pci_probe() allocates PCI resources through rtw_pci_setup_resource() before it sets up NAPI. If rtw_pci_napi_init() fails, the error path jumps straight to err_pci_declaim and skips rtw_pci_destroy(), leaving the PCI resources allocated by rtw_pci_setup_resource() behind. Add a dedicated cleanup label for the NAPI setup failure path so probe destroys the PCI resources. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing current mainline kernels. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc7. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have a suitable rtw88 PCI board to test with, no runtime testing was able to be performed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw89: pci: add .shutdown callback to stop rfkill polling on reboot Since the hardware rfkill polling was introduced, arm64 platforms can panic with an asynchronous SError during warm reboot: SError Interrupt on CPU8, code 0x00000000be000011 -- SError Workqueue: events_power_efficient rfkill_poll [rfkill] rtw89_pci_ops_read8+0x94/0x160 [rtw89_pci] rtw89_core_rfkill_poll+0x50/0x1e0 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ops_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x68 [rtw89_core] ieee80211_rfkill_poll+0x3c/0x70 [mac80211] cfg80211_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x2a0 [cfg80211] rfkill_poll+0x30/0x88 [rfkill] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt On the reboot path the kernel only runs device_shutdown(), which calls each driver's .shutdown callback; .remove is not invoked. The rtw89 PCI driver had no .shutdown callback, so nothing stopped the rfkill polling work while the platform was tearing the PCIe link down. Once the link is gone, the next MMIO read from the poll handler targets a non-responding device and is reported as a fatal asynchronous SError on arm64. Add rtw89_pci_shutdown(), wired to all rtw89 PCI device drivers, which sets a new RTW89_FLAG_SHUTDOWN flag (mirroring the USB RTW89_FLAG_UNPLUGGED pattern). When the flag is set, rtw89_ops_rfkill_poll() returns early, so no MMIO read is issued to the chip after shutdown begins and the SError no longer occurs. This does not call the full .remove path from .shutdown, to keep the shutdown handler minimal and avoid running the non-idempotent teardown twice.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7615: avoid waiting for mac work under the mt76 mutex mt7615_suspend() acquired the mt76 mutex and then called cancel_delayed_work_sync() on mac_work. mt7615_mac_work() acquires the same mutex via mt7615_mutex_acquire() at the top of the worker, so if mac_work is already running and blocked on the mutex, the suspend path deadlocks waiting for the work it holds the mutex against. Flush scan_work and mac_work before taking the mutex, matching the suspend paths in mt7921 and mt7925. scan_work only takes the mt76 spinlock, but moving it keeps the sequence consistent. This also keeps mac_work from running over an already suspended HIF, which the previous split (async cancel under the lock, sync cancel after release) would have allowed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix TX DMA mapping leak for AddBA req frames mt7996/mt7992 hand the firmware a HW MAC-TXP for AddBA req action frames (MT_TXD7_MAC_TXD, set in mt7996_mac_write_txwi_80211()), but are otherwise FW-TXP devices. On tx free mt76_connac_txp_skb_unmap() therefore decodes the per-frame txp as a struct mt76_connac_fw_txp. For a MAC-TXP the fw_txp.nbuf byte aliases the AddBA TID word (MT_TXP1_TID_ADDBA), which is always zero, so the unmap loop runs zero times and the skb DMA mapping in buf[1] is never unmapped. buf[1].skip_unmap is set unconditionally, so the generic DMA-ring cleanup skips it as well. Each AddBA req therefore leaks one TX DMA mapping, roughly one per (re)association. With WED enabled these mappings are bounced through the WED swiotlb pool, so under continuous client reconnect churn the pool is exhausted after ~1-2 days, after which DMA mapping fails for WED, the WiFi MCU and other on-SoC consumers. Keep the deferred (token release) unmap that the design relies on, and add an mt7996-specific txp unmap that inspects MT_TXD7_MAC_TXD and unmaps buf[1] from the MAC-TXP layout for those frames, delegating to mt76_connac_txp_skb_unmap() otherwise.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: tpm_i2c_nuvoton: disable IRQ on wait timeout i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat() enables the IRQ before waiting for the interrupt handler to report a status change. If the wait times out, or is interrupted before the handler runs, the function returns without balancing the enable_irq() call. Disable the IRQ before leaving the failed wait path. Also preserve an interrupted wait's original error code instead of converting it to -ETIMEDOUT inside the helper.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: timekeeping: Check the return value of tk_get_aux_ts64 in __do_adjtimex() If the auxiliary clock is disabled during tk_get_aux_ts64() but is enabled before tks->clock_valid is checked, then uninitialized stackdata will be used in the calculations and indirectly leaked to userspace. The same race window also exists after this change and also for the core timekeeper. But in these cases the only effect would be incorrect adjustments and this is userspace's responsibility to avoid this.
Certain Woltlab products are affected by RCE via Cache Poisoning. WCF >= 6.1.0 until < 6.1.23 and WCF >= 6.2.0 until < 6.2.6. An authenticated low-privileged user can inject PHP into executable cache files generated by WoltLab Suite Core. Attacker-controlled data can terminate the nowdoc prematurely and inject arbitrary PHP Code.
Linkstack v4.8.4 and earlier is vulnerable to Path Traversal, which allows an administrator to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating file path input. Successful exploitation may lead to unauthorized access to sensitive system or application files.