In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint The driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device which only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint. Make sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: mct_u232: fix missing interrupt-in transfer sanity check Add the missing sanity check on the size of interrupt-in transfers to avoid parsing stale or uninitialised slab data (and leaking it to user space).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the descriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever requiring dlen >= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The named descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked their per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor (fip_dtype >= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently ignore) skipped that check entirely. An unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could hang fcoe_ctlr_recv_work on an fcoe, qedf, or bnx2fc initiator indefinitely by emitting one FIP CVL frame whose single descriptor had fip_dtype == FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL and fip_dlen == 0: the cursor advanced zero bytes per iteration and the loop condition rlen >= sizeof(*desc) stayed true forever, blocking every subsequent FIP frame on that controller. Tighten the outer dlen guard to also reject dlen < sizeof(struct fip_desc), so a malformed descriptor whose length cannot even cover the descriptor header is rejected before the switch. This is the same lower-bound the named cases already apply and is the minimum scope that closes the loop.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: dz: Convert to use a platform device Prevent a crash from happening as the first serial port is initialised: Console: switching to colour frame buffer device 160x64 tgafb: SFB+ detected, rev=0x02 fb0: Digital ZLX-E1 frame buffer device at 0x1e000000 DECstation DZ serial driver version 1.04 CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000bc, epc == 8048b3a4, ra == 80470a78 Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.19.0-dirty #35 NONE $ 0 : 00000000 1000ac00 00000004 804707ac $ 4 : 00000000 80e20850 80e20858 81000030 $ 8 : 00000000 8072c81c 00000008 fefefeff $12 : 6c616972 00000006 80c5917f 69726420 $16 : 80e20800 00000000 808f8968 80e20800 $20 : 00000000 807f5a90 808b0094 808d3bc8 $24 : 00000018 80479030 $28 : 80c2e000 80c2fd70 00000069 80470a78 Hi : 00000004 Lo : 00000000 epc : 8048b3a4 __dev_fwnode+0x0/0xc ra : 80470a78 serial_base_ctrl_add+0xa0/0x168 Status: 1000ac04 IEp Cause : 30000008 (ExcCode 02) BadVA : 000000bc PrId : 00000220 (R3000) Modules linked in: Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000) Stack : 00400044 00400040 8046f4cc 00000000 808a6148 808a0000 808f8968 8086983c 808e0000 8046fc84 1000ac01 00000028 80e20700 802ba3f8 80e20700 80d34a94 80c1b900 80e20700 80e20700 80e20700 80e20700 80444650 00000000 00000000 00000000 807f5a90 808b0094 80447080 00400040 808e0000 80d34a94 808a6148 80d34a94 00000004 80e20700 00000000 8076974c 80469810 80c2fe3c 1000ac01 ... Call Trace: [<8048b3a4>] __dev_fwnode+0x0/0xc [<80470a78>] serial_base_ctrl_add+0xa0/0x168 [<8046fc84>] serial_core_register_port+0x1c8/0x974 [<808c6af0>] dz_init+0x74/0xc8 [<800470e0>] do_one_initcall+0x44/0x2d4 [<808b111c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x258/0x308 [<8072e434>] kernel_init+0x20/0x114 [<80049cd0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Code: 27bd0018 03e00008 2402ffea <8c8200bc> 03e00008 00000000 27bdffc0 afbe0038 afb30024 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- -- where a pointer is dereferenced that has been derived from a null pointer to the port's parent device. Since no device is available with legacy probing and it's not anymore a preferable way to discover devices anyway, switch the driver to using a platform device and use it as the port's parent device. Update resource handling accordingly and only request the actual span of addresses used within the slot, which will have had its resource already requested by generic platform device code. Use platform_driver_probe() not just because the DZ device is fixed with solder on board and not straightforward to remove, but foremost because the associated TTY's major device number is the same as used by the zs driver and the first driver to claim it will prevent the other one from using it. Either one DZ device or some SCC devices will be present in a given system but never both at a time, and therefore we want the major device number to be claimed by the first driver to actually successfully bind to its device and platform_driver_probe() is a way to fulfil that. An unfortunate consequence of the switch to a platform device is we now hand the console over from the bootconsole much later in the bootstrap. The firmware console handler appears good enough though to work so late and in particular with interrupts enabled. Conversely only starting the console port so late lets the reset code fully utilise our delay handlers, so switch from udelay() to fsleep() for transmitter draining so as to avoid busy-waiting for an excessive amount of time.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: zs: Convert to use a platform device Prevent a crash from happening as the first serial port is initialised: Console: switching to mono frame buffer device 160x64 fb0: PMAG-AA frame buffer device at tc0 DECstation Z85C30 serial driver version 0.10 CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000002c, epc == 803ab00c, ra == 803aafe0 Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-00031-g84a9582fd203-dirty #57 $ 0 : 00000000 10012c00 803aaeb0 00000000 $ 4 : 80e12f60 80e12f50 80e12f58 81000030 $ 8 : 00000000 805ff37c 00000000 33433538 $12 : 65732030 00000006 80c2915d 6c616972 $16 : 80e12f00 807b7630 00000000 00000000 $20 : 00000004 00000348 000001a0 807623b8 $24 : 00000018 00000000 $28 : 80c24000 80c25d60 8078b148 803aafe0 Hi : 00000000 Lo : 00000000 epc : 803ab00c serial_base_ctrl_add+0x78/0xf4 ra : 803aafe0 serial_base_ctrl_add+0x4c/0xf4 Status: 10012c03 KERNEL EXL IE Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02) BadVA : 0000002c PrId : 00000440 (R4400SC) Modules linked in: Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000) Stack : 80760000 00000cc0 00400044 00400040 803aa02c 80d61ab8 00000000 807b7630 80760000 807623b8 807b7628 803aa644 80386998 00000000 80e17780 80220f68 80e17780 80d61ab8 80c17d80 80e17780 80e17780 8063c798 80e17780 80383fa0 00000010 80e17780 00000000 80386998 807a0000 00000000 00400040 8038f848 807623b8 80d61ab8 00000004 80e17780 00000000 803a68e4 80c25e2c 803bb884 ... Call Trace: [<803ab00c>] serial_base_ctrl_add+0x78/0xf4 [<803aa644>] serial_core_register_port+0x174/0x69c [<8077e9ac>] zs_init+0xc8/0xfc [<800404d4>] do_one_initcall+0x40/0x2ac [<8076cecc>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1e4/0x270 [<80605bec>] kernel_init+0x20/0x108 [<800431e8>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Code: 2442aeb0 ae120024 ae0200d0 <8c67002c> 50e00001 8c670000 3c06806e 3c05806e afb30010 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- (report at the offending commit) -- where a pointer is dereferenced that has been derived from a null pointer to the port's parent device. Since no device is available with legacy probing and it's not anymore a preferable way to discover devices anyway, switch the driver to using a platform device and use it as the port's parent device. Update resource handling accordingly and only request the actual span of addresses used within the slot, which will have had its resource already requested by generic platform device code. Use platform_driver_probe() not just because SCC devices are fixed with solder on board and not straightforward to remove, but foremost because the associated TTY's major device number is the same as used by the dz driver and the first driver to claim it will prevent the other one from using it. Either one DZ device or some SCC devices will be present in a given system but never both at a time, and therefore we want the major device number to be claimed by the first driver to actually successfully bind to its device and platform_driver_probe() is a way to fulfil that. An unfortunate consequence of the switch to a platform device is we now hand the console over from the bootconsole much later in the bootstrap. The firmware console handler appears good enough though to work so late and in particular with interrupts enabled. Since there is one way only remaining to reach zs_reset() now, remove the port initialisation marker as no longer needed and go through the channel reset unconditionally.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: Add NULL guards in teardown path to prevent panic on attach failure When queue allocation fails partway through, the error cleanup frees and NULLs apc->tx_qp and apc->rxqs. Multiple teardown paths such as mana_remove(), mana_change_mtu() recovery, and internal error handling in mana_alloc_queues() can subsequently call into functions that dereference these pointers without NULL checks: - mana_chn_setxdp() dereferences apc->rxqs[0], causing a NULL pointer dereference panic (CR2: 0000000000000000 at mana_chn_setxdp+0x26). - mana_destroy_vport() iterates apc->rxqs without a NULL check. - mana_fence_rqs() iterates apc->rxqs without a NULL check. - mana_dealloc_queues() iterates apc->tx_qp without a NULL check. Add NULL guards for apc->rxqs in mana_fence_rqs(), mana_destroy_vport(), and before the mana_chn_setxdp() call. Add a NULL guard for apc->tx_qp in mana_dealloc_queues() to skip TX queue draining when TX queues were never allocated or already freed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in rt6_fill_node() Sashiko reported this issue [1]. Apply the same fix as commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()"). Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings) without waiting for RCU readers; rt->fib6_siblings.next then still points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches &rt->fib6_siblings, causing a CPU stall. fib6_del_route() always WRITE_ONCE()s rt->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: validate connector number in ucsi_connector_change() The connector number in a UCSI CCI notification is a 7-bit field supplied by the PPM. ucsi_connector_change() uses it to index the ucsi->connector[] array without checking it against the number of connectors the PPM reported at init time, so a buggy or malicious PPM (EC firmware, or an I2C-attached UCSI controller on the ccg / stm32g0 / glink transports) can drive schedule_work() on memory past the end of the array. Reject connector numbers that are zero or exceed cap.num_connectors before dereferencing the array.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: fix NULL pointer bug in svm_range_set_attr The process_info could be NULL if user doesn't call kfd_ioctl_acquire_vm before calling kfd_ioctl_svm. (cherry picked from commit 83a26c812e0529eb040d31a76f73e33e637243d4)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: validate VDO count in Discover Identity ACK handlers Properly validate the count passed from a device when calling svdm_consume_identity() or svdm_consume_identity_sop_prime() as the device-controlled value could index off of the static arrays, which could leak data.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes() svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every point in the loop. In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set, an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes, the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen SVID/VDO bytes. Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner supplies or how the function was reached.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm/tcpci_maxim: validate header NDO against RX_BYTE_CNT A broken/malicious port can transmit a CRC-valid frame whose header advertises up to seven data objects but whose body carries fewer than that. Check for this, and rightfully reject the message, instead of reading from uninitialized stack memory.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing accesses beyond the actual array. Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the packet length.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read() but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported as a measurement result. Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage. This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the variable as used uninitialized.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: buffer: Fix DMA fence leak in iio_buffer_enqueue_dmabuf() iio_buffer_enqueue_dmabuf() allocates a struct iio_dma_fence (104 bytes, kmalloc-128) via kmalloc_obj()+dma_fence_init(), which sets the initial kref to 1. It then calls dma_resv_add_fence() which takes a second reference (kref=2), and stores a raw pointer in block->fence. On the success path the function returns without calling dma_fence_put() to release the initial reference, so every buffer enqueue permanently leaks one kmalloc-128 allocation. The iio_buffer_cleanup() work item only releases the temporary reference taken during completion signalling by iio_buffer_signal_dmabuf_done(); the initial reference from dma_fence_init() is never released. With four iio_rwdev instances at 240kHz and 512 samples per buffer, this produces ~1875 kmalloc-128 allocations per second matching the observed slab growth exactly. A test with ftrace confirmed that the dma_fence_destroy event was never triggered. Fix by calling dma_fence_put() after dma_resv_add_fence(), transferring ownership of the fence to the DMA reservation object. The DMA fence then gets properly discarded after being signalled.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: composite: fix integer underflow in WebUSB GET_URL handling The WebUSB GET_URL handler in composite_setup() narrows landing_page_length to fit the host-supplied wLength using landing_page_length = w_length - WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_offset; If wLength is smaller than WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH the unsigned subtraction wraps, and the subsequent memcpy(url_descriptor->URL, cdev->landing_page + landing_page_offset, landing_page_length - landing_page_offset); ends up copying close to UINT_MAX bytes from cdev->landing_page into cdev->req->buf. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds in composite_setup on the kmalloc-2k gadget_info allocation, and FORTIFY_SOURCE traps the memcpy as a 4294967293-byte field-spanning write into url_descriptor->URL (size 252). A USB host can reach this from a single SETUP packet against any gadget that has webusb/use=1 and a landingPage configured. Handle the small-wLength case before the math: when the host requested fewer bytes than the URL descriptor header, only the header is meaningful and no URL bytes need to be copied. Setting landing_page_length to landing_page_offset makes the existing memcpy a no-op and leaves the descriptor returned to the host unchanged for all larger wLength values.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: fix race between deleting interface and adding new peer While deleting an existing ovpn interface, there is a very narrow window where adding a new peer via netlink may cause the netdevice to hang and prevent its unregistration. It may happen during ovpn_dellink(), when all existing peers are freed and the device is queued for deregistration, but a CMD_PEER_NEW message comes in adding a new peer that takes again a reference to the netdev. At this point there is no way to release the device because we are under the assumption that all peers were already released. Fix the race condition by releasing all peers in ndo_uninit(), when the netdevice has already been removed from the netdev list. Also ovpn_peer_add() has now an extra check that forces the function to bail out if the device reg_state is not REGISTERED. This way any incoming CMD_PEER_NEW racing with the interface deletion routine will simply stop before adding the peer. Note that the above check happens while holding the netdev_lock to prevent racing netdev state changes. ovpn_dellink() is now empty and can be removed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Fix ethx:ingress -> ethy:egress -> ethx:ingress mirred loop When mirred redirects to ingress (from either ingress or egress) the loop state from sched_mirred_dev array dev is lost because of 1) the packet deferral into the backlog and 2) the fact the sched_mirred_dev array is cleared. In such cases, if there was a loop we won't discover it. Here's a simple test to reproduce: ip a add dev port0 10.10.10.11/24 tc qdisc add dev port0 clsact tc filter add dev port0 egress protocol ip \ prio 10 matchall action mirred ingress redirect dev port1 tc qdisc add dev port1 clsact tc filter add dev port1 ingress protocol ip \ prio 10 matchall action mirred egress redirect dev port0 ping -c 1 -W0.01 10.10.10.10
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: imu: adis16550: fix stack leak in trigger handler adis16550_trigger_handler() declares the scan data array on the stack without initializing it. The memcpy() at the bottom fills only the first 28 bytes (TEMP + 6 channels of GYRO/ACCEL data), and iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() writes the s64 timestamp at the 8-byte-aligned offset 32. Bytes 28-31 remain uninitialized stack data which leaks to userspace on ever trigger. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of stack are pushed to userspace per scan. This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing. bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a short-fill issue. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the reply. Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of overwriting st->buf.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix lock leak on ENOMEM in AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO The AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO branch of amdgpu_gem_op_ioctl() holds three cleanup-tracked resources before calling kvcalloc(): the drm_gem_object reference from drm_gem_object_lookup(), the drm_exec lock on the looked-up GEM via drm_exec_lock_obj(), and the drm_exec lock on the per-process VM root page directory via amdgpu_vm_lock_pd(). All three are released by the out_exec label that every other error path in this function jumps to. The kvcalloc() failure path returns -ENOMEM directly, skipping out_exec and leaking all three. The leaked per-process VM root PD dma_resv lock is the load-bearing leak: any subsequent operation on the same VM (further GEM ops, command-submission, eviction, TTM shrinker callbacks) blocks on the held lock. DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_GEM_OP is DRM_AUTH | DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so this is an unprivileged-local denial of service against the caller's GPU context, reachable by any process with /dev/dri/renderD* access. Route the failure through out_exec so drm_exec_fini() and drm_gem_object_put() run. Reproduced on stock 7.0.0-10, Ryzen 7 5700U / Radeon Vega (Lucienne): the failing ioctl returns -ENOMEM and a second GET_MAPPING_INFO on the same fd then blocks in drm_exec_lock_obj() on the leaked dma_resv. SIGKILL on the caller does not reap the task; the fd-release path during process exit goes through amdgpu_gem_object_close() -> drm_exec_prepare_obj() on the same lock, leaving the task in D state until the box is rebooted. The patched kernel was not rebuilt and re-tested on this hardware; the fix is mechanical. Tested on a single Lucienne / Vega box only. Ziyi Guo posted an independent INT_MAX-bound check for args->num_entries in the same branch [1]; the two patches are complementary and can land in either order. (cherry picked from commit b69d3256d79de15f54c322986ff4da68f1d65b0a)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: check num_entries in GEM_OP GET_MAPPING_INFO kvcalloc(args->num_entries, sizeof(*vm_entries), GFP_KERNEL) at amdgpu_gem.c:1050 uses the user-supplied num_entries directly without any upper bounds check. Since num_entries is a __u32 and sizeof(drm_amdgpu_gem_vm_entry) is 32 bytes, a large num_entries produces an allocation exceeding INT_MAX, triggering WARNING in __kvmalloc_node_noprof(), causing a kernel WARNING, TAINT_WARN, and panic on CONFIG_PANIC_ON_WARN=y systems. Add a size bounds check before we invoke the kvzalloc() to reject oversized num_entries early with -EINVAL. (cherry picked from commit 1fe7bf5457f6efd7be60b17e23163ba54341d73d)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: Fix error return when vfs_mkdir() fails When vfs_mkdir() fails, the error code is not extracted from the returned error pointer. This causes mkdir_error to be reached with ret=0, which leads to returning ERR_PTR(0) (NULL) instead of a proper error pointer. Fix this by extracting the error code from the error pointer when vfs_mkdir() fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/migrate_device: fix pgtable leak in migrate_vma_insert_huge_pmd_page When migrate_vma_insert_huge_pmd_page() jumps to unlock_abort due to a PMD check failure, the pgtable allocated earlier via pte_alloc_one() is never freed, causing a memory leak. Added free_abort label to release the pgtable in error path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: nxp-sar-adc: fix division by zero in write_raw Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it as a divisor. A user writing zero or a negative value to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. Also prevent unsigned integer underflow when the computed cycle count is smaller than NXP_SAR_ADC_CONV_TIME, which would wrap the u32 inpsamp to a huge value.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uio: uio_pci_generic_sva: fix double free of devm_kzalloc() memory uio_pci_sva allocates struct uio_pci_sva_dev with devm_kzalloc() in probe(), but then calls kfree(udev) both on the probe() error path (label out_free) and again in remove(). Because devm_kzalloc() allocations are devres-managed and are freed automatically when the device is detached (including after a failing probe() and during driver unbind), the explicit kfree() can lead to a double free. If probe() fails after devm_kzalloc(), the error path frees udev and devres cleanup will free it again when the core unwinds the partially bound device. On normal driver removal, remove() frees udev and devres will free it again when the device is detached. This issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review. Fix by removing the manual kfree() calls and dropping the now-unused label.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_mirred: Fix blockcast recursion bypass leading to stack overflow tcf_mirred_act() checks sched_mirred_nest against MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT (4) to prevent deep recursion. However, when the action uses blockcast (tcfm_blockid != 0), the function returns at the tcf_blockcast() call BEFORE reaching the counter increment. As a result, the recursion counter never advances and the limit check is entirely bypassed. When two devices share a TC egress block with a mirred blockcast rule, a packet egressing on device A is mirrored to device B via blockcast; device B's egress TC re-enters tcf_mirred_act() via blockcast and mirrors back to A, creating an unbounded recursion loop: tcf_mirred_act -> tcf_blockcast -> tcf_mirred_to_dev -> dev_queue_xmit -> sch_handle_egress -> tcf_classify -> tcf_mirred_act -> (repeat) This recursion continues until the kernel stack overflows. The bug is reachable from an unprivileged user via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET): user namespaces grant CAP_NET_ADMIN in the new network namespace, which is sufficient to create dummy devices, attach clsact qdiscs with shared blocks, and install mirred blockcast filters. BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90000b7fff8 Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 1000 PID: 169 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-next-20260410 RIP: 0010:xas_find+0x17/0x480 Call Trace: xa_find+0x17b/0x1d0 tcf_mirred_act+0x640/0x1060 tcf_action_exec+0x400/0x530 basic_classify+0x128/0x1d0 tcf_classify+0xd83/0x1150 tc_run+0x328/0x620 __dev_queue_xmit+0x797/0x3100 tcf_mirred_to_dev+0x7b1/0xf70 tcf_mirred_act+0x68a/0x1060 [repeating ~30+ times until stack overflow] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Fix this by incrementing sched_mirred_nest before calling tcf_blockcast() and decrementing it on return, mirroring the non-blockcast path. This ensures subsequent recursive entries see the updated counter and are correctly limited by MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Avoid NULL return from hist_field_name() on truncation hist_field_name() returns "" everywhere except the fully-qualified VAR_REF/EXPR case, where snprintf() truncation returns NULL early and bypasses the bottom NULL->"" guard. Callers don't expect NULL: strcat(expr, hist_field_name(field, 0)) at trace_events_hist.c:1758 and the strcmp() in the sort-key match loop at :4804 both deref it. system and event_name are bounded by MAX_EVENT_NAME_LEN, but the field name on a VAR_REF is kstrdup'd from a histogram variable name parsed out of the trigger string and has no length cap, so a long enough var name in a fully qualified reference can reach the truncation path. Keep the length check but leave field_name as "" on overflow.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: refuse to enslave CAN devices syzbot reported a kernel paging request crash in can_rx_unregister() inside net/can/af_can.c. The crash occurs because a virtual CAN device (vxcan) is being enslaved to a bonding master. During the enslavement process, the bonding driver mutates and modifies the network device states to fit an Ethernet-like aggregation model. However, CAN devices operate on a completely different Layer 2 architecture, relying on the CAN mid-layer private data structure (can_ml_priv) instead of standard Ethernet structures. Since bonding does not initialize or maintain these CAN structures, subsequent operations on the half-enslaved interface (such as closing associated sockets via isotp_release) lead to a null-pointer dereference when accessing the CAN receiver lists. Bonding CAN interfaces is architecturally invalid as CAN lacks MAC addresses, ARP capabilities, and standard Ethernet link-layer mechanisms. While generic loopback devices are blocked globally in net/core/dev.c, virtual CAN devices bypass this check because they do not carry the IFF_LOOPBACK flag, despite acting as local software-loopbacks. Fix this by explicitly blocking network devices of type ARPHRD_CAN from being enslaved at the very beginning of bond_enslave(). This prevents illegal state mutations, eliminates the resulting KASAN crashes, and avoids potential memory leaks from incomplete socket cleanups. As the CAN support has been added a long time after bonding the Fixes-tag points to the introduction of ARPHRD_CAN that would have needed a specific handling in bonding_main.c.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len) and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a threshold. Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535). The existing adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still reach roughly 0xfeff. The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size (1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the packed header - so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes. read_data() callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the walk. A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read past the coherent DMA allocation. The first index whose byte exceeds NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events. Far enough out, the read can also hit an unmapped page and fault. Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and x_len to data_len.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_sfb: Replace direct dequeue call with peek and qdisc_dequeue_peeked When sfb has children (eg qfq qdisc) whose peek() callback is qdisc_peek_dequeued(), we could get a kernel panic. When the parent of such qdiscs (eg illustrated in patch #3 as tbf) wants to retrieve an skb from its child (sfb in this case), it will do the following: 1a. do a peek() - and when sensing there's an skb the child can offer, then - the child in this case(sfb) calls its child's (qfq) peek. qfq does the right thing and will return the gso_skb queue packet. Note: if there wasnt a gso_skb entry then qfq will store it there. 1b. invoke a dequeue() on the child (sfb). And herein lies the problem. - sfb will call the child's dequeue() which will essentially just try to grab something of qfq's queue. [ 127.594489][ T453] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000048-0x000000000000004f] [ 127.594741][ T453] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 453 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-00035-gac961974495b-dirty #793 PREEMPT(full) [ 127.595059][ T453] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 127.595254][ T453] RIP: 0010:qfq_dequeue+0x35c/0x1650 [sch_qfq] [ 127.595461][ T453] Code: 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 17 0e 00 00 4c 8d 73 48 48 89 9d b8 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 76 0c 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b [ 127.596081][ T453] RSP: 0018:ffff88810e5af440 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 127.596337][ T453] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [ 127.596623][ T453] RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000001880000000 RDI: ffff888104fd82b0 [ 127.596917][ T453] RBP: ffff888104fd8000 R08: ffff888104fd8280 R09: 1ffff110211893a3 [ 127.597165][ T453] R10: 1ffff110211893a6 R11: 1ffff110211893a7 R12: 0000001880000000 [ 127.597404][ T453] R13: ffff888104fd82b8 R14: 0000000000000048 R15: 0000000040000000 [ 127.597644][ T453] FS: 00007fc380cbfc40(0000) GS:ffff88816f2a8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 127.597956][ T453] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 127.598160][ T453] CR2: 00005610aa9890a8 CR3: 000000010369e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 127.598390][ T453] PKRU: 55555554 [ 127.598509][ T453] Call Trace: [ 127.598629][ T453] <TASK> [ 127.598718][ T453] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 [ 127.598890][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 127.599053][ T453] sfb_dequeue+0x88/0x4d0 [ 127.599174][ T453] ? ktime_get+0x137/0x230 [ 127.599328][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 127.599480][ T453] ? qdisc_peek_dequeued+0x7b/0x350 [sch_qfq] [ 127.599670][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 127.599831][ T453] tbf_dequeue+0x6b1/0x1098 [sch_tbf] [ 127.599988][ T453] __qdisc_run+0x169/0x1900 The right thing to do in #1b is to grab the skb off gso_skb queue. This patchset fixes that issue by changing #1b to use qdisc_dequeue_peeked() method instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: 6lowpan: check skb_clone() return value in send_mcast_pkt() The skb_clone() function can return NULL if memory allocation fails. send_mcast_pkt() calls skb_clone() without checking the return value, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference in send_pkt() when it dereferences skb->data. Add a NULL check after skb_clone() and skip the peer if the clone fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store() linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]: write(fd, "", 0); -> message_store(..., buf, count=0) -> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0) -> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation (kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0), so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count-- wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul(). linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attribute, mode 0644) and from the in-tree initial-message setup with count == -1, so the OOB path is only userspace-triggerable via zero-byte writes; vfs_write() does not short-circuit on count == 0 and kernfs_fop_write_iter() dispatches the store callback regardless. Guard the trailing-newline trim with a count check. The existing if (!count) block then takes the clear-display path unchanged. Affects every auxdisplay driver that registers via linedisp_register() / linedisp_attach(): ht16k33, max6959, img-ascii-lcd, seg-led-gpio.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: fix dst corruption in same register operation For lshift and rshift, the shift operations are performed in a loop over 32-bit words. The loop calculates the shifted value and write it to dst, and then immediately reads from src to calculate the carry for the next iteration. Because src and dst could point to the same memory location, the carry is incorrectly calculated using the newly modified dst value instead of the original src value. Adding a temporary local variable to cache the original value before writing to dst and using it for the carry calculation solves the problem. In addition, partial overlap is rejected from control plane for all kind of operations including byteorder. This was tested with the following bytecode: table test_table ip flags 0 use 1 handle 1 ip test_table test_chain use 3 type filter hook input prio 0 policy accept packets 0 bytes 0 flags 1 ip test_table test_chain 2 [ immediate reg 1 0x44332211 0x88776655 ] [ bitwise reg 1 = ( reg 1 << 0x08000000 ) ] [ cmp eq reg 1 0x66443322 0x00887766 ] [ counter pkts 0 bytes 0 ] ip test_table test_chain 4 3 [ immediate reg 1 0x44332211 0x88776655 ] [ bitwise reg 1 = ( reg 1 << 0x08000000 ) ] [ cmp eq reg 1 0x55443322 0x00887766 ] [ counter pkts 21794 bytes 1917798 ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix setup list UAF on proc write error snd_pcm_oss_proc_write() links a newly allocated setup entry into the OSS setup list before duplicating the task name. If the task-name allocation fails, the error path frees the already linked entry and leaves setup_list pointing at freed memory. A later OSS device open can then walk the stale list entry in snd_pcm_oss_look_for_setup() and dereference freed memory. Allocate the task name and initialize the setup entry before publishing the entry on setup_list. Also fetch the initial proc read iterator only after taking setup_mutex, so all setup_list traversal follows the same list lifetime rules.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: module: avoid leaking a netdev ref on module flash errors module_flash_fw_schedule() is missing undo for setting the "in_progress" flag and taking the netdev reference. Delay taking these, the device can't disappear while we are holding rtnl_lock.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: rsnd: Fix potential out-of-bounds access of component_dais[] component_dais[RSND_MAX_COMPONENT] is initially zero-initialized and later populated in rsnd_dai_of_node(). However, the existing boundary check: if (i >= RSND_MAX_COMPONENT) does not guarantee that the last valid element remains zero. As a result, the loop can rely on component_dais[RSND_MAX_COMPONENT] being zero, which may lead to an out-of-bounds access. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Avoid mounting the bdev pseudo-filesystem in userspace The bdev pseudo-filesystem is an internal kernel filesystem with which userspace should not interfere. Unregister it so that userspace cannot even attempt to mount it. This fixes a bug [1] that occurs when attempting to access files, because the system call move_mount() uses pointers declared in the inode_operations structure, which for the bdev pseudo-filesystem are always equal to 0. `inode->i_op = &empty_iops;` [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 23380067 P4D 23380067 PUD 23381067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 17125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.155-syzkaller-00350-g84221fde2681 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: <TASK> lookup_open.isra.0+0x700/0x1180 fs/namei.c:3460 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3550 [inline] path_openat+0x953/0x2700 fs/namei.c:3780 do_filp_open+0x1c5/0x410 fs/namei.c:3810 do_sys_openat2+0x171/0x4d0 fs/open.c:1318 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1334 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1350 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x13c/0x1f0 fs/open.c:1345 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (lm90) Stop work before releasing hwmon device Sashiko reports: In lm90_probe(), the devm action to cancel the alert_work and report_work (lm90_restore_conf) is registered in lm90_init_client() before devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info() is called. Because devm executes cleanup actions in reverse order during module unbind or probe failure, the hwmon device is unregistered and freed first. If lm90_alert_work() or lm90_report_alarms() runs in the window between the hwmon device being freed and the delayed works being cancelled, lm90_update_alarms() will dereference the freed data->hwmon_dev here. Fix the problem by canceling the workers separately after registering the hwmon device and before registering the interrupt handler. This ensures that the workers are canceled after interrupts are disabled and before the hwmon device is released. Add "shutdown" flag to indicate that device shutdown is in progress to prevent workers from being re-armed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: aggregator: remove the software node when deactivating the aggregator The dynamic software node we create for the aggregator platform device when using configfs is leaked when the device is deactivated. Destroy it as the last step in the tear-down path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/oa: Fix exec_queue leak on width check in stream open In xe_oa_stream_open_ioctl(), when param.exec_q->width > 1 the function returns -EOPNOTSUPP directly, skipping the existing err_exec_q cleanup path. The exec_queue reference obtained by xe_exec_queue_lookup() is leaked. The exec queue holds a reference on the xe_file, which is only dropped during queue teardown. The leaked lookup ref is not on the file's exec_queue xarray, so file close cannot release it. This keeps both the exec queue and the file private state pinned indefinitely. Jump to err_exec_q instead of returning directly so the reference is released. (cherry picked from commit 339fa0be9e4a5d69fa47e91f4a36574224fb478f)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: rss: fix indir_table and hkey leak on get_rxfh failure rss_prepare_get() allocates the indirection table and hash key buffer via rss_get_data_alloc(), then calls ops->get_rxfh() to populate them. If get_rxfh() fails, the function returns an error without freeing the allocation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: module: call ethnl_ops_complete() on module flash errors When validate() fails we are skipping over ethnl_ops_complete() even tho we already called ethnl_ops_begin().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bridge: Fix sleep in atomic context in netlink path Since the introduction of the netlink configuration path for bridge ports in commit 25c71c75ac87 ("bridge: bridge port parameters over netlink"), br_setport() was always called with the bridge lock held around it. Back then this decision made sense: The bridge lock protects the STP state of the bridge and its ports and at that time the function only processed three STP related netlink attributes (cost, priority and state). Nowadays, br_setport() processes a lot more attributes and most of them do not need the bridge lock: * Bridge flags: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * FDB port flushing: Only requires the FDB lock. * Multicast attributes: Only require the multicast lock. * Group forward mask: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * Backup port and NHID: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. This is a problem as the bridge calls dev_set_promiscuity() when certain bridge port flags change and this function can sleep since the commit cited below, resulting in a splat such as [1]. Fix this by reducing the scope of the bridge lock and only take it when processing the three STP related attributes that require it. This is consistent with the multicast attributes where each attribute acquires the multicast lock instead of having one critical section for all relevant attributes. [1] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 356, name: bridge preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 2 locks held by bridge/356: #0: ffffffff919473a0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:7002) #1: ffff888115072d58 (&br->lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: br_setlink (./include/linux/spinlock.h:348 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1117) Preemption disabled at: 0x0 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) __might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9163) netif_rx_mode_run (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262) netif_rx_mode_sync (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1428) dev_set_promiscuity (net/core/dev_api.c:289) br_manage_promisc (net/bridge/br_if.c:135 net/bridge/br_if.c:172) br_port_flags_change (net/bridge/br_if.c:242 net/bridge/br_if.c:747) br_setport (net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1000) br_setlink (net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1118) rtnl_bridge_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7005) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:787 (discriminator 4) net/socket.c:802 (discriminator 4)) ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2698) ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2752) __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2784) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bridge: Fix sleep in atomic context in sysfs path Since the start of the git history, brport_store() always acquired the bridge lock. Back then this decision made sense: The bridge lock protects the STP state of the bridge and its ports and at that time the function was only used by two STP related attributes (cost and priority). Nowadays, brport_store() processes a lot more attributes and most of them do not need the bridge lock: * Bridge flags: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * FDB port flushing: Only requires the FDB lock. * Multicast attributes: Only require the multicast lock. * Group forward mask: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * Backup port: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. This is a problem as the bridge calls dev_set_promiscuity() when certain bridge port flags change and this function can sleep since the commit cited below, resulting in a splat such as [1]. Fix this by reducing the scope of the bridge lock and only take it when processing the two STP related attributes that require it. Remove the now stale comment from br_switchdev_set_port_flag(). The SWITCHDEV_F_DEFER flag can be removed in net-next. [1] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 372, name: bash preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 5 locks held by bash/372: #0: ffff88810c51c3f0 (sb_writers#7){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) #1: ffff888115ce9480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:343) #2: ffff88810b9fd330 (kn->active#37){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:80 fs/kernfs/file.c:344) #3: ffffffffa59473a0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:326) #4: ffff8881099d2d58 (&br->lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: brport_store (./include/linux/spinlock.h:348 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:345) Preemption disabled at: 0x0 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) __might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9163) netif_rx_mode_run (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262) netif_rx_mode_sync (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1428) dev_set_promiscuity (net/core/dev_api.c:289) br_manage_promisc (net/bridge/br_if.c:135 net/bridge/br_if.c:172) br_port_flags_change (net/bridge/br_if.c:242 net/bridge/br_if.c:747) store_learning (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:79 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:235) brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:346) kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:352) new_sync_write (fs/read_write.c:595) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: tsinfo: don't pass ERR_PTR to genlmsg_cancel on prepare failure The goto err label leads to: genlmsg_cancel(skb, ehdr); return ret; If ethnl_tsinfo_prepare_dump() failed, it has not started a genlmsg. There's nothing to cancel, and passing an error pointer to genlmsg_cancel() would cause a crash.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fix packet loop on netem when duplicate is on When netem duplicates a packet it re-enqueues the copy at the root qdisc. If another netem sits in the tree the copy can be duplicated again, recursing until the stack or memory is exhausted. The original duplication guard temporarily zeroed q->duplicate around the re-enqueue, but that does not cover all cases because it is per-qdisc state shared across all concurrent enqueue paths and is not safe without additional locking. Use the skb tc_depth field introduced in an earlier patch: - increment it on the duplicate before re-enqueue - skip duplication for any skb whose tc_depth is already non-zero. This marks the packet itself rather than mutating qdisc state, therefore it is safe regardless of tree topology or concurrency.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ena: PHC: Check return code before setting timestamp output ena_phc_gettimex64() is setting the output parameter regardless of whether ena_com_phc_get_timestamp() succeeded or failed. When ena_com_phc_get_timestamp() returns an error, the timestamp parameter may contain uninitialized stack memory (e.g., when PHC is disabled or in blocked state) or invalid hardware values. Passing these to userspace via the PTP ioctl is both a security issue (information leak) and a correctness bug. Fix by checking the return code after releasing the lock and only setting the output timestamp on success.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: garp: fix unsigned integer underflow in garp_pdu_parse_attr The receive-side GARP attribute parser computes dlen with reversed operands: dlen = sizeof(*ga) - ga->len; ga->len is the on-wire attribute length and includes the GARP attribute header. For normal attributes with data, ga->len is larger than sizeof(*ga), so the subtraction underflows in unsigned arithmetic. The resulting value is later passed to garp_attr_lookup(), whose length argument is u8. After truncation, the parsed data length usually no longer matches the length stored for locally registered attributes, so received Join/Leave events are ignored. This breaks the GARP receive path for common attributes, such as GVRP VLAN registration attributes. Compute the data length as the attribute length minus the header length.